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ABSTRACT 
 
Colin Campbell: Three Studies on the Determinants and Consequences of Poverty 
(Under the direction of Arne L. Kalleberg) 
 
 
In this dissertation I consider the effect of dropping out of high school on poverty and 
welfare receipt, the effect of sibship size on cognitive ability and early educational achievement, 
and the determinants of support for government involvement in lessening poverty. Using a 
variety of multivariate methods and data sources, (1) I find that dropping out of high school has 
an independent effect on poverty and welfare receipt net of unobserved background 
characteristics, but the consequences of dropping out and the role of unobserved background 
characteristics have changed over time; (2) I find a clear association between sibship size and 
cognitive development and early educational achievement in both low-income and affluent 
households, but I find little support for a causal interpretation of these findings; and (3) I find 
that the social and economic contexts when people come of age do not color beliefs about the 
government’s role in lessening poverty, but beliefs do shift in response to economic hardship.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
In 1964, President Johnson famously declared an unconditional war on poverty, aiming 
not just to reduce the number of poor families or to make living in poverty more endurable, but 
to completely eliminate poverty. In the subsequent years, the federal government proposed a 
number of initiatives to help improve the education, health, and labor market outcomes of the 
poor. These initiatives gave birth to Medicare and Medicaid, and made a pilot food stamps 
program permanent. These initiatives also expanded Social Security benefits, increased benefits 
levels for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, and established the Jobs Corps and VISTA 
programs. These initiatives also created Head Start, Title I programs, and the now defunct Office 
of Economic Opportunity.  
Social scientists at the time were optimistic that poverty could be greatly reduced or even 
eliminated. James Tobin, an adviser to President Johnson and an economics professor at Yale 
University, believed poverty could be completely eradicated in the US by 1976 (Tobin 1967). 
Robert Lampman, also an adviser to President Johnson and the founding director of the first 
federally funded poverty research center in the United States, was slightly less optimistic, 
arguing that poverty in the US could be completely eradicated, but not until 1980 (Lampman 
1971).  
 In the decade following the announcement of the government’s war on poverty, there was 
a steady decline in the poverty rate. In 1965, the poverty rate was 17.3 percent. By 1973, the 
poverty rate had declined to 11.1 percent (see Figure 1). However, instead of a continued march 
toward zero, declines in the poverty rate stalled, and 1973 marks the lowest point for the poverty 
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rate in the past 50 years. For the 40 years since 1973, the poverty rate has hovered around 13 
percent, moving with economic booms and busts but never abating to the single digits.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Poverty Rate, 1959-2012. 
 
Source: US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1960-2013 Annual Social and Economic Supplements.
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 At the same time, intergenerational mobility out of poverty has remained low. Children 
born in the poorest decile have a 31.5 percent chance of ending up in the poorest decile as an 
adult, and a 51.3 percent chance of ending up in the poorest quintile (Hertz 2005). For children 
from the poorest thirty percent of households, close to two-thirds will stay among the poorest 
thirty percent as adults. These numbers are astounding and disheartening: one in two children 
from the poorest tenth of households will end up among the poorest fifth as adults; only one in 
three children from the poorest thirty percent of households will move up beyond the poorest 
thirty percent of adults.  
 These trends are difficult to explain. In the mid-twentieth century, social scientists were 
optimistic that the poverty rate could be greatly diminished and the government took action to 
improve the chances of upward mobility for poor children. However, the poverty rate never 
dipped below one in ten and intergenerational mobility out of poverty remained limited. In turn, 
social scientists refocused their attention, seeking a better understanding of the social forces that 
maintain poverty. Unfortunately, progress has been slow and greatly hindered by methodological 
challenges.  
A particular difficulty is parsing out the relationship between poverty and social and 
economic contexts. The poor face a large number of related problems. The complexity and 
interconnectedness of the issues affecting the poor makes it difficult to separate causes of 
poverty from symptoms of poverty. Consider the relationship between poverty and educational 
attainment. Growing up in poverty is associated with a decreased likelihood of completing high 
school. At the same time, not completing high school is associated with an increased risk of 
poverty. Separating the extent to which not completing high school leads to poverty and the 
extent to which growing up in poverty leads to not completing high school (and then subsequent 
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poverty) is methodologically difficult. Given the complexity and the closely related nature of the 
issues affecting the poor, we are left with lingering questions. 
This dissertation offers three pieces of empirical research that move forward our 
understanding of how social and economic contexts are related to poverty. In these papers, I 
investigate how social and economic contexts can lead to a biased understanding of what 
troubles the poor. I also examine how social and economic contexts can create divergent beliefs 
about the role of the government in lessening poverty. Taken as a whole, this dissertation offers a 
careful investigation of what ails the poor and what does not and also an improved understanding 
of the determinants of support for government action to lessen poverty. 
 Before providing a brief overview of each paper, it is worthwhile to consider why 
studying poverty is important. At the individual level, poverty has numerous consequences. 
Poverty leads to health problems, a shortened life expectancy, and an increased risk of criminal 
activity. These individual consequences have societal costs. Consider children raised in poor 
families. Children raised in poor families complete fewer years of education and have worse 
cognitive outcomes. As a result, the US economy wastes an immense amount of potential worker 
productivity and earnings. At the same time, children raised in poor families are more likely to 
be involved in crime and are also more likely to suffer from poor health. As a result, 
expenditures on the criminal justice system and health care are artificially high, and worker 
productivity is again squandered because of losses to health limitations or imprisonment. Holzer 
et al (2007) estimate that childhood poverty costs the US about $500 billion per year through the 
loss of worker productivity and expenditures related to health and crime.  
 Poverty also has a more general macroeconomic significance. In particular, increases in 
the poverty rate can slow economic growth. As the poverty rate increases, the market of 
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available consumers shrinks, demand for goods and services decreases, and economic growth 
slows. Consumers not directly affected by the increased poverty rate, weary of increasing 
economic hardship, become less likely to spend disposable income and worsen the decreased 
demand for goods and services. Conversely, decreases in the poverty rate leads to an increase in 
the number of people able to purchase goods and services, and can help stimulate economic 
growth (Bluestone & Harrison 2000).  
Moreover, myths and misperceptions about poverty are common. In many instances, 
misperceptions are entirely misplaced. For example, a common misperception is that the 
majority of poor are African American or that the majority of the poor are unemployed (Iceland 
2012; O’Hare 1996). Both are inaccurate perceptions and are easily falsified. In other instances, 
misperceptions reign because of the absence of robust empirical research. The papers presented 
in this dissertation subject three common perceptions to rigorous analysis, assessing (1) to what 
extent the poor are poor because of low levels of educational attainment, (2) to what extent 
sibship size in low-income households shapes cognitive development and early educational 
achievement, and (3) to what extent economic hardship determines beliefs about lessening 
poverty. 
Section 1.1: Overview of Dissertation 
Paper 1:  High School Dropouts, Poverty, and Welfare 
Research on the determinants of poverty routinely highlights the role of education, 
arguing the poor are poor because of low levels of educational attainment. There is good reason 
to suspect that education is a determinant of poverty status. Educational attainment is an 
excellent predictor of a number of social and economic outcomes, including wages, health, 
  6 
employment status, and, importantly, poverty status. Notably, over one in four high school 
dropouts are in poverty compared to fewer than one in twenty college graduates.  
 Similarly, existing research proposes a number of mechanisms through which educational 
attainment has the potential to directly influence poverty status. Most obviously, human capital 
models show that increases in human capital are associated with increases in earnings. Those 
with less education acquire less human capital and are able to demand less from the labor 
market. As a result, they face an increased risk of poverty. Similarly, research on credentialism, 
social closures, and signaling shows how the presence of a degree can reap benefits for the 
credentialed even in the absence of skill differentials. In effect, individuals with less education 
may be formally limited to a smaller pool of available jobs or employers may doubt the abilities 
of the less educated, which in turn increases the risk of poverty.   
  However, the role of educational attainment in determining who is poor and who is not is 
muddied by nonrandom selection into different levels of educational attainment. Existing 
research finds that various sociodemographic groups face an increased risk of not completing 
high school, or conversely, that various sociodemographic groups face an increased “risk” of 
completing college. In particular, family and neighborhood characteristics are an important 
determinant of high school completion. Ultimately, those who do not complete high school are 
likely different from high school graduates in meaningful and important ways in the same way 
that college graduates are likely different from high school graduates in meaningful and 
important ways.  
 Acknowledging that educational attainment is far from random is not inherently 
problematic for accurately understanding the extent to which educational attainment leads to 
poverty. Instead, selection effects become a concern because of the innate difficulties in 
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measuring factors that contribute to selection into different levels of educational attainment. For 
example, parental behaviors influence the likelihood of completing high school. If a researcher’s 
analytic strategy does not account for parental behaviors, then findings will be inaccurate 
because of omitted variable bias. Researchers could attempt to account for parental behaviors 
and other parental characteristics but they would need extremely detailed data to feel confident 
that the effect of educational attainment is not biased by unmeasured parental traits. This is only 
one example of the difficulty of measuring relevant characteristics, but there are many others. 
Consider the importance of neighborhoods. Neighborhoods have an important affect on 
educational attainment. Consequently, researchers need to be careful to account for 
neighborhood effects when considering the consequences of low levels of educational 
attainment. However, neighborhood effects are notoriously difficult to observe and measure in 
survey data. Thus, researchers again run the risk of confounding neighborhood effects and 
educational attainment effects.  
 If we return to the guiding question—to what extent are low levels of educational 
attainment responsible for the high rates of poverty among the less educated—we realize that 
while education has become one of the most prominent explanations for understanding who is 
poor and who is not, the issue is far from resolved. In the first paper of this dissertation, I 
examine the extent to which dropping out of high school is responsible for the increased risk of 
poverty and welfare receipt among high school dropouts. To account for difficult to measure 
family and neighborhood characteristics, I base model estimation on within family differences. 
In effect, I compare siblings who completed high school to their siblings who dropped out of 
high school. This provides a straightforward control for unobserved background effects. We no 
longer need to worry about accounting for parental traits because siblings share the same parents. 
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Similarly, we no longer need to worry about observing neighborhood characteristics because 
siblings live in the same neighborhood.   
 The research presented in this paper improves our understanding of the relationship 
between educational attainment and poverty. Increased educational attainment is routinely 
offered as a panacea for what ails the poor without a critical assessment of how social and 
economic contexts influence both poverty and educational attainment. This research offers a 
more nuanced and complete understanding of the extent to which dropping out of high school 
leads to poverty and welfare receipt.  
Paper 2: Sibship Size, Cognitive Ability, and Early Educational Achievement 
In the second paper in this dissertation, I consider whether variations in sibship size have 
meaningful consequences on cognitive ability or early educational achievement for children in 
low-income households. Figure 2 motivates this research. Panel A of Figure 2 shows variations 
in the average number of children in a household by mother’s income-to-poverty ratio. Panel B 
of Figure 2 shows variations in cognitive test scores by sibship size. Panel C of Figure 2 shows 
the percent of kindergarteners not promoted to first grade by sibship size. We see that poorer 
mothers have more children on average and that the number of siblings in a household is 
negatively associated with both cognitive ability and first grade promotion.  
 Research consistently finds that sibship size leads to worse education outcomes for 
children. Couple this finding with the fact that poor families on average have more children, and 
sibship size seems like an obvious candidate for a pathway from living in poverty to poor 
education outcomes. Indeed, there is a popular narrative that argues poor families have too many 
children, and because of this, children in poor families have arrested cognitive development and 
worse education outcomes. The underlying reasoning to this narrative is straightforward. Parents  
  9 
Figure 1.2 Sibship Size, Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Score, and First Grade Promotion. 
 
Note: Data come from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) is 
a standardized test that measures verbal ability and scholastic aptitude.   
 
 
invest time and financial resources in their children. These investments are positively associated 
with cognitive development and early educational achievement. The more a parent is able to 
invest, the better off their child’s cognitive development and early educational achievement. In 
poor households, resources that are already stretched thin are further stretched by large family 
size. The narrative argues if poor households had fewer children, each child could receive more 
resources and would have improved cognitive development and educational achievement. While 
this narrative is perhaps intuitively appealing, it is empirically thin.  
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 Sibship size—like educational attainment—is not random. Thus, researchers must take 
selection effects seriously. The ability of Ordinary Least Squares regression models—the 
prevailing method used in past studies—to accurately capture the pathways from sibship size to 
outcomes is questionable. Therefore, I draw on a variety of multivariate approaches to examine 
the effects of sibship size on cognitive development and early educational achievement. Beyond 
OLS models, I conduct propensity score matching analysis and instrumental variable models. In 
the propensity score matching analyses, I pair children who are similar in meaningful ways and 
only differ in their number of siblings. In the instrumental variable models, I use an exogenous 
shock on sibship size—whether the mother of a poor household experiences a miscarriage—to 
obtain an unbiased sibship size effect.  
 Aside from selections effects and methodological concerns, there is an additional reason 
to suspect that sibship size may not matter or be less important in low-income households. 
Namely, the social and economic contexts that have the potential to lead to sibling penalties on 
cognitive development and early educational achievement may not be present in low-income 
households. For example, in middle class households an additional sibling may mean that parents 
elect to send their children to public school instead of private school. In low-income households, 
private school is unlikely an option regardless of sibship size. This research, therefore, adds to 
our understanding of how variations in social and economic contexts across income groups have 
the potential to yield different effects.   
 This research two important implications. First, this research focuses on a specific 
mechanism, which helps move poverty research beyond associations. The poor face a large 
number of related problems. To understand how living in poverty leads to adverse outcomes, we 
must separate mechanisms from correlations. It is not enough to find that growing up in poverty 
  11 
leads to adverse outcomes. It is critical to identify the actual mechanisms that lead to adverse 
outcomes. Yes, the poor on average have larger family sizes, and yes, poor children on average 
have worse education outcomes, but does sibship size negatively affect the education outcomes 
of poor children? This research offers an empirical test of a specific mechanism that may lead 
from living in poverty to worse outcomes.  
 Second, variations in cognitive ability and early educational achievement are associated 
with an array of deleterious consequences, including decreased educational attainment, increased 
delinquency, and future economic disadvantage. Accordingly, the effect of sibship size on 
cognitive ability and early educational achievement has important implications for our 
understanding of achievement gaps between poor and non-poor children. If increases in sibship 
size negatively affect cognitive development and early educational achievement, then sibship 
size should help inform our understanding of achievement gaps in the same way that other 
family effects do.  
Paper 3: Economic Hardship and Beliefs about Government Spending on Poverty 
Opposition to antipoverty policies in the US is commonplace. However, opposition is 
inconsistent across policies. As an illustrative example, consider Figure 3, which shows support 
for government spending on welfare (left panel) and government spending on assistance for the 
poor (right panel) from 1984 to 2012. Here we see the percentage of people who believe the 
government spends too much on welfare, the percentage of people who believe the government 
spends too much on assistance for the poor, the percentage of people who believe the 
government spends too little on welfare, and the percentage of people who believe the 
government spends too little on assistance for the poor. The differences are striking. Few people 
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believe the government spends too much on assistance for the poor. Yet, the plurality of people 
consistently believes the government spends too much on welfare. 
There is an impressive body of research that attempts to explain the discrepancies 
observed in Figure 3 and a similarly impressive body of research that investigates public support 
for government spending on poverty in general. Research on attitudes toward government 
spending on welfare and poverty largely rely on theories that emphasize the role of economic  
 
Figure 1.3 Support for government spending on welfare and assistance to the poor, 1984-2012. 
 
Note: Data come from the General Social Survey. Question reads: “We are faced with many problems in this 
country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and 
for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little, or about 
the right amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare/assistance to the 
poor?” Trend for “about right” not shown.  
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precarity. Unfortunately, past research has a large blind spot: it exclusively focuses on current 
conditions while overlooking past experiences. In effect, existing theories privilege current social 
and economic contexts—income, job security, educational attainment, macroeconomic climate—
at the expense of past experiences. While current social and economic contexts are undoubtedly 
important—and existing research demonstrates the significant role of current social and 
economic contexts—entirely overlooking the role of past contexts is imprudent.  
In the third paper in this dissertation, I consider how views of the current are colored by 
the past. I draw on a rich body of literature from social psychology that shows experiences that 
occur during late adolescence and early adulthood can have a profound impact on life long 
attitudes and explore whether generational differences in beliefs exist net of current social and 
economic contexts. Are the cohorts who came of age during the war on poverty more or less 
likely to support government spending on poverty than the cohorts who came of age during 
welfare reform in the mid-1990s? 
Existing research is further limited because it largely relies on cross-sectional data. As a 
result, sociological understandings of the fluidity of beliefs about government spending on 
poverty are incomplete. Are attitudes toward government spending on poverty fixed or do they 
respond to changes in economic contexts? When an individual experiences a change in her 
economic standing, do her beliefs follow? To answer these questions, I draw on longitudinal data 
to examine the stability and fluidity of beliefs about government spending on poverty. In 
particular, I examine whether suffering an economic hardship produces an increase in support for 
government spending on poverty.  
The three papers presented in this dissertation pay careful attention to how social and 
economic contexts are related to poverty. In the first two papers, I examine how improved 
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accounting for social and economic contexts can influence our understanding of the determinants 
and consequences of poverty. In the third paper, I show how social and economic contexts can 
have a meaningful effect on beliefs about government spending on poverty. Taken together, 
these three papers serve as a call for poverty researchers to judiciously examine how social and 
economic contexts relate to poverty and a reminder of how symptoms of poverty can mistaken as 
a causes of poverty. 
15 
REFERENCES 
Bluestone, Barry, and Bennett Harrison. 2000. Growing Prosperity: The Battle for Growth with  
Equity in the Twenty-First Century. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.  
 
Hertz, Tom. 2005. Rags, Riches, and Race: The Intergenerational Economic Mobility of Black  
and White Families in the United States. In Unequal Chances: Family Background and 
Economic Success. Pp. 165-91. Eds. Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis, and Melissa 
Osborne Groves. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Holzer, Harry J., Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, Greg J. Duncan, and Jens Ludwig. 2007. The  
Economic Costs of Poverty in the United States: Subsequent Effects of Children Growing 
Up Poor. Discussion Paper no. 1327-07. Institute for Research On Poverty, Madison WI.  
 
Iceland, John. 2012. Poverty in America: A Handbook. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
Lampman, Robert. 1971. Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty. Chicago: Markham. 
 
O’Hare, William P. 1996. A New Look at Poverty in America. Population Bulletin 51:1-48. 
 
Tobin, James. 1967. It Can Be Done! Conquering Poverty in the US by 1976. New Republic, 3  
June 1967, 14. 
 
 
  16 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: THE SOCIOECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF DROPPING OUT: 
EVIDENCE FROM TWO COHORTS OF SIBLINGS 
 
Introduction 
The belief that dropping out of high school causes pervasive and persistent 
socioeconomic disadvantage is widespread. Viewed through the lens of cross-sectional 
associations, the relationship between dropping out and future disadvantage is obvious—poverty 
rates, unemployment rates, and rates of welfare receipt for high school dropouts are significantly 
higher than the respective rates for high school graduates (Boisjoly et al 1998; Caspi et al 1998; 
Iceland 2012; National Center for Education Statistics 2012; US Census Bureau 2010). However, 
before concluding that dropping out is responsible for the increased risk of hardship, researchers 
must be careful to account for ways the population of dropouts differs from the population of 
high school graduates.  
Put simply, high school dropouts likely face an elevated risk of socioeconomic 
disadvantage irrespective of their dropout status. The question, therefore, is not whether high 
school dropouts face an increased risk of disadvantage. They do. Instead, the question is whether 
dropping out of high school is responsible for the increased risk of disadvantage. If high school 
dropouts had completed high school, would they be any better off? 
Research on the consequences of dropping out is surprisingly underdeveloped. Nearly 
three decades ago, Natriello, Pallas, and McDill (1986) called for researchers to investigate the 
social and economic effects of dropping out, writing:  
There is a clear need for research on the consequences of dropping out. 
We know rather little about either the economic or social consequences of 
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dropping out . . . In order to do this, we need detailed information on the 
experiences and characteristics of dropouts before they left high school, as 
well as data on their labor market experiences … (p. 175). 
 
This call for research on the consequences of dropping out has largely gone unanswered. Instead, 
discussions of the costs of dropping out have had to rely on cross-sectional associations (for 
example, see Rumberger 1987; Cheeseman Day & Newburger 2002). While cross-sectional 
associations reveal the level of disparity between high school graduates and high school 
dropouts, they do not speak to the extent that dropping out contributes to the observed disparity. 
The absence of research is likely due to the difficulty of assessing the true costs of 
dropping out. Natriello, Pallas, and McDill point out the need for detailed data on dropouts 
before they leave school. Without such data, researchers run the risk of confounding dropout 
effects with the effects of early life social and economic contexts. This is particularly important 
because dropouts come disproportionately from already disadvantaged backgrounds (Alexander, 
Entwisle, & Horsey 1997; Brooks-Gunn, Guo, & Furstenberg 1993; Duncan et al 1998; 
Rumberger 1987; Stearns and Glennie 2006), a strong determinant of both high school 
completion and economic hardship. The early and adolescent disadvantage that lead an 
individual to drop out likely also creates an increased risk of adult economic hardship. By the 
time an individual drops out of school, the risk of economic hardship may already be firmly in 
place.   
 In this study, I examine the effect of dropping out on future poverty and welfare receipt. I 
base model estimation on within-family differences, comparing individuals who dropped out of 
high school to their siblings who completed high school. This method provides a straightforward 
control for unobserved background effects, leveraging the shared backgrounds of siblings to 
isolate a dropout effect that is independent of background characteristics. By basing model 
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estimation on within-family differences, the research presented here is better able to account for 
heterogeneity in the population of dropouts.   
I make two additional contributions. First, I present conventional ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression estimates of the effect of dropping out on future poverty and welfare receipt 
using the same data. By comparing conventional and within-family estimates, I am able to 
discern the extent to which differences in the backgrounds of dropouts are responsible for cross-
sectional associations between dropping out and future socioeconomic disadvantage. In 
particular, I am able to assess how unobserved characteristics may bias OLS estimates. Second, I 
analyze data from two cohorts of siblings, one cohort was high school age in the 1970s and the 
other was high school age in the 1990s. By comparing across cohorts, I am able to assess how 
the costs of dropping out have changed over time and also able to determine how the role of 
social background effects have increased or decreased in importance.  
 I first present arguments for why dropping out of high school likely leads to future 
poverty and welfare receipt, highlighting the role of skill differentials, credentialism, social 
closures, and signaling theory. I next discuss reasons for why the increased risk of disadvantaged 
faced by dropouts is likely overstated, emphasizing the difficulty of isolating an independent 
dropout effect using conventional OLS methods. I then outline the data, measures, and analytic 
strategy used in this paper. Lastly, I present findings from conventional OLS regression 
estimates and within-family estimates. I conclude with a discussion of how recent policy shifts 
have the potential to worsen the socioeconomic standing of low-ability students.  
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Background 
There are strong theoretical reasons to suspect that dropping out increases the risk of 
economic hardship net of background characteristics. First, it is possible that dropping out of 
high school produces an actual skill differential between dropouts and high school graduates. In 
effect, because dropouts do not complete all years of schooling, they do not develop the same 
level of skills and competencies. In this scenario, observed differences in poverty are indeed the 
result of dropping out. Had dropouts stayed in school, they would have acquired more skills and 
be able to demand more from the labor market. 
 The extent to which additional years of schooling leads to an increase in skills and an 
increase in future earnings is uncertain. The ambiguity is due to differences in who completes 
more years of education. Without experimental data, it is hard to assess whether differences in 
outcomes by educational attainment are the result of more years of education or the result of who 
completes more years of education. This is often referred to as “ability bias”—those with greater 
ability likely choose to complete more years of education. A large body of research has 
attempted to identify the true effect of education on a variety of outcomes and has produced 
mixed evidence (for a review, see Card 1999). While most of this research examines the effects 
of educational attainment in general, the few studies that do consider high school dropouts in 
particular have produces similarly equivocal results.   
For example, Angrist and Krueger (1991) famously approximate the conditions of a 
natural experiment by leveraging compulsory schooling laws and season of birth, noting that 
individuals born in the first quarter of the calendar year become eligible to drop out of high 
school a school year earlier than individuals born later in the calendar year. Angrist and Krueger 
find that students who are forced to attend school longer because of where their birthday falls in 
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the calendar year earn higher wages as a result of their increased schooling. However, these 
findings are strongly disputed and often used as an example of the shortcomings of instrumental 
variables. In particular, Bound, Jaeger, & Baker (1995) and Staiger and Stock (1997) show that 
the instrumental variable used by Angrist and Krueger—season of birth—explains little of the 
variation in educational attainment, making it too weak of an instrument to be informative. 
 Similarly, there is debate over whether more years of schooling produces greater skills 
and ability between dropouts and high school graduates. Alexander, Natriello, and Pallas (1985) 
compare cognitive development for dropouts and high school graduates. They find that 
individuals who stay in school see more of an increase in cognitive skills than those who drop 
out. However, the effect sizes are modest—the average difference in cognitive test performance 
between dropouts and high school graduates was about one-tenth of a standard deviation. 
Additionally, even if staying in school does generate differences in skills and abilities, it is 
unclear whether that matters. Griffin, Kalleberg, and Alexander (1981) find that aptitude, class 
rank, and other school information has minimal and often insignificant effects on employment 
and other job related outcomes for high school graduates who enter the workforce directly upon 
high school completion. This conclusion is supported by a host of studies that find no effect or 
even a negative effect of high school grades on earnings (Kang & Bishop 1986; Miller 1998; 
Rosenbaum & Kariya 1991), and others who find that noncognitive traits—traits that are unlikely 
to be acquired through increased schooling—are much stronger predictors of labor market 
outcomes (Bowles & Gintis 2002; Cawley, Heckman, & Vytlacil 2001; Sewell & Hauser 1975). 
However, research that is not limited to high school dropouts does find an association between 
cognitive ability and earnings (Farkas 1996; Farkas et al 1997).  
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Leaving aside these debates, we can also point to credentialism, social closures, and 
signaling theory as offering a theoretical motivation for an independent effect of dropping out on 
future disadvantage. We can think of credentialism as the extent to which employment or wages 
are allocated based on the possession of an education credential at the time of hiring, and social 
closures as the requirement of a degree to obtain a given position (Bills & Brown 2011; Bol & 
van der Werfhost 2011; Weeden 2002). Thus, a high school diploma could be important for a 
number of reasons: employers may see the credential as a status marker or regulations may 
require an employer to hire an individual with a high school diploma. If we imagine two 
potential job candidates that are equal in all ways except that Candidate A has a high school 
diploma and Candidate B does not, we could reasonably expect a perspective employer, because 
of credentialism or social closures, to prefer Candidate A to Candidate B. Ultimately, because of 
credentialism or social closure mechanisms, dropouts may be restricted to a smaller pool of 
available jobs or have limited potential wage growth. Thus, while a dropout may be qualified or 
have the needed abilities for a given employment opportunity, she will be passed over for the 
position because of the availability of someone with greater credentials or formal restrictions 
preventing her from obtaining the position.     
A potential employer may also prefer Candidate A because the employer believes 
Candidate A’s high school diploma—or Candidate B’s lack of diploma—is representative of 
other characteristics and traits. According to signaling theory, employers value information about 
job candidates; however, because obtaining information about job candidates is costly, 
employers rely on readily available “signals” (Rosenbaum et al 1990; Spence 1973). Therefore, 
rather than fully assessing the skills and competencies of all job candidates, employers interpret 
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available information—such as educational credentials—to infer the abilities and qualities of job 
applicants (Blaug 1976).  
Signaling theory has important implications for the socioeconomic standing of dropouts. 
Specifically, while a given high school dropout may possess the same skills and knowledge as a 
high school graduate, employers may see the high school diploma—or the absence of a high 
school diploma—as signaling unobservable characteristics, leading employers to prefer high 
school graduates. 
Heckman and Rubinstein (2001) offer a classic example of the possible role of signaling 
in influencing labor market outcomes. They show that persons with a GED earn less than persons 
who completed high school. They argue that while a GED shows that an individual has 
comparable cognitive abilities to a high school graduate, it also signals to employers that GED 
holders “lack the ability to think ahead, to persists in tasks, or to adapt to their environments” 
(145). A similar conclusion holds for high school dropouts, only they also lack a certificate that 
asserts they possess cognitive abilities comparable to a high school graduate. 
However, the evidence for signaling theory is far from decisive. Bills (1988) contends 
personality traits are as important to employers as formal education. Rosenbaum (2001) shows 
employers value soft skills over education related abilities. Cappelli (1995) contends employers 
rank character and attitude higher than education credentials. Moss and Tilly (2001) show 
employers privilege dependability and interpersonal communication above all else.   
Overall, theories of labor market allocation offer strong motivation but mixed evidence 
for an independent effect of dropping out. There are clear reasons for why high school dropouts 
may be less qualified for a job, and there are similarly clear reasons for why an employer may 
prefer high school graduates to high school dropouts. However, the extent to which dropping out 
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independently matters is less clear. Of particular concern is the ways in which dropouts and high 
school graduates differ beyond a high school diploma.    
If individuals who drop out of high school are systematically different from those who 
complete high school, then researchers must be careful to account for these differences. If 
researchers are unable to account for differences between the two populations, there is reason to 
be concerned that observed differences between dropouts and high school graduates are due to 
unobserved variations. In effect, the observed differences in poverty and welfare receipt are not 
the result of dropping out, but instead are the result of the factors that lead individuals to drop 
out—the result of early life disadvantage and social contexts.  
Past research has identified two populations that are at particular risk of dropping out: 
residents of economically disadvantaged neighborhoods and members of poor families. 
According to research on neighborhood effects, all things being equal, children who grow up in 
neighborhoods with a high concentration of disadvantage are more likely to drop out of high 
school than children who grow up in more affluent neighborhoods. Results from experiments and 
quasi-experiments such as Gatreaux and Moving to Opportunity have generally confirmed this 
finding: individuals who move from high poverty neighborhoods to middle class neighborhoods 
are more likely to graduate from high school (DeLuca & Dayton 2009). Methodological debates 
notwithstanding, observational studies also confirm the basic tenets of neighborhood effects 
(Brooks-Gunn et al 1993; Crowder & South 2011; Harding 2003; Wodtke, Harding, & Elwert 
2011). 
If neighborhood effects could be easily measured in observational data, then the 
confounding of neighborhood effects and dropout effects would be of little concern. Researchers 
could simply control for neighborhood disadvantage and obtain a reliable estimate of the dropout 
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effect net of neighborhood effects. Unfortunately, neighborhoods effects are diverse and not 
easily measured. For example, Brooks-Gunn and colleagues (1993) find that living in a 
neighborhood with very few professional or managerial workers is associated with dropping out; 
Harding (2011) shows that neighborhood cultural context influences educational attainment; 
Crowder and South (2011) demonstrate that neighborhoods surrounding the immediate 
neighborhood of residence influence dropout rates. Overall, the diversity and complexity of 
neighborhood effects makes it difficult for researchers to confidently isolate a dropout effect 
using conventional OLS methods—should researchers include variables for the number of 
managers living in a neighborhood? how should a researcher operationalize neighborhood 
culture? what information about surrounding neighborhoods is relevant? Ruling out 
neighborhood effects with OLS methods and nonexperimental data is a near impossibility. 
Similarly, the likelihood of dropping out varies by family socioeconomic status. Children 
and adolescents who grow up in poverty are less likely to complete high school (Alexander, 
Entwisle, & Horsey 1997; Duncan et al 1998). Numerous family characteristics influence 
educational attainment, and, like the confounding effects created by neighborhood disadvantage, 
researchers must account for relevant family characteristics to confidently estimate an isolated 
dropout effect. 
 Fully accounting for relevant family characteristics is a difficult task. For example, how 
often parents and children discuss school, whether parents are involved in parent-teacher 
organizations, and whether parents limit time watching television all influence the likelihood of 
high school completion (McNeal 1999). Similarly, parent-school connectivity matters in some 
contexts but not in others (Teachman et al 1996), and parenting practices are an important 
determinant of high school completion, but explain little of the difference in dropout rates 
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between “intact” and “nonintact” families (Astone & McLanahan 1991). To control for relevant 
family characteristics using conventional regression methods, researchers must account for an 
array of variables that are difficult to observe and measure, let alone operationalize.  
 In sum, for researchers to confidently isolate a dropout effect, they must account for the 
determinants of dropping out. Using conventional regression methods, this would take a heroic 
effort and implausibly rich data. If relevant determinants of dropping out are omitted or 
measured inaccurately, then what appears to be a dropout effect on poverty may really be the 
result of omitted or poorly measured background characteristics. The implications are obvious 
and important: the same factors that lead adolescents to drop out may also lead to future poverty 
and welfare receipt—growing up in disadvantaged neighborhoods and families is strongly 
associated with adult poverty (Corcoran 1995; Duncan et al 1998; McLanahan 1985; Wagmiller 
et al 2006). For high school dropouts, the alternative to dropping out and poverty may be a high 
school diploma and poverty. 
Data and Measures 
Examining the consequences of dropping out requires detailed information on high 
school graduates and high school dropouts before they completed their education and also 
information on subsequent economic hardship. Because of the difficulty of measuring and 
observing all relevant background characteristics, a more robust method than conventional OLS 
methods is to compare siblings who have disparate education outcomes. I further elaborate on 
this point in the Analytic Strategy section of this paper, but for now it is sufficient to say that we 
need data that includes a sample of siblings and contains information on background 
characteristics, educational attainment, and subsequent economic hardship. The National 
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Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 and 1997 (NLSY79 and NLSY97) cohorts meet these 
requirements.  
The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of young adults who were between the 
ages of 14 and 22 when initially surveyed in 1979. From 1979 to 1994, follow-up waves were 
conducted annually. From 1994 to 2010, follow-up waves were conducted biennially. I transform 
the data to be structured by respondent age, not survey year. In effect, the baseline for all 
respondent is when they are 18 years of age, not 1979; t2 is when respondents are 19 years old, 
not 1980; t3 is when respondents are 20 years old, and so on. 
The NLSY79 is comprised of three subsamples: a cross-sectional sample of 6,111 youths, 
a supplemental sample of 5,295 Hispanic, black, and economically disadvantaged youths, and a 
military sample of 1,280 youths. The full sample in the baseline survey was 12,686. All eligible 
respondents within a household were included in the initial sample. The 11,406 civilian 
respondents come from 7,490 unique households. 2,862 households include more than one 
NLSY79 respondent. The multi-respondent households include a total of 5,914 siblings.  
To assess changes in the consequences of dropping out over time, I also use NLSY97. 
NLSY97 is a nationally representative sample of young adults who were between the ages of 12 
and 16 when initially surveyed in 1997. Follow-up waves were conducted annually, and data are 
available through 2010. I impose the same time structure on NLSY97, where the baseline for all 
respondents is when they are 18 years of age, t2 is when respondents are 19 years old and so on. 
The original NLSY97 sample included 8,984 respondents. 3,885 respondents have at least one 
sibling in the sample. When combined, the NLSY79 and NLSY97, provide data on 9,270 
siblings from age 18 to 44, giving an analytic sample of 438,118 person years.   
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The two outcomes, poverty status and welfare receipt, are both measured with indicator 
variables. Poverty status is measured using the official US Census Bureau thresholds with 
thresholds adjusted by family size. A respondent is defined as in poverty if his or her household 
income fell below the poverty threshold. A respondent is defined as having received welfare if he 
or she reported any cash income from Aid to Families with Dependent Children (up to 1996) or 
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (after 1996), the main cash welfare programs in the 
US. Note that while poverty and welfare receipt are related, they are only weakly correlated to 
each other (0.27). This is because many people living in poverty elect to not participate (often 
out of ideological commitments or an inability to meet participation requirements), are unaware 
they are eligible, are ineligible despite having an income below the poverty line, or are unable to 
successfully enroll.    
A respondent is defined as having dropped out if she has not completed high school and 
is not currently enrolled in school. To account for within-family heterogeneity, I include 
measures of scholastic aptitude (standardized AFQT score), delinquency (regular use of alcohol 
or tobacco before the age of 18), and teen pregnancy (becoming a father or mother before the age 
of 18). The measures of within family heterogeneity help account for sibling differences that are 
associated with dropping out. For example, by including a measure of scholastic aptitude, we can 
be more confident that differences by dropout status are not really differences in scholastic 
aptitude. This issue is discussed in more detail in the analytic strategy. I also include 
demographic and background variables that are related to dropping out and economic hardship, 
including sex (male/female), race (white/black/Hispanic), whether respondent is the oldest 
sibling, marital status (single/married/divorced, separated, or widowed), parents’ educational 
attainment (total years), urbanicty (central city/SMSA/not in SMSA), and region of residence  
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Table 2.1 Summary Statistics and Coding for All Variables. 
!! Description and Coding Time Variant Mean 
Outcome Variables 
   
Poverty Status 
1 = income fell below US Census Bureau poverty 
threshold; 0 = income exceeded poverty threshold Yes 0.22 
Welfare Receipt 
1 = reported any cash income from AFDC or TANF; 
0 = did not report income from AFDC or TANF Yes 0.04 
Independent Variables 
   
Dropout Status 
1 = not currently enrolled in school and does not have 
a high school diploma; 0 = completed high school 
only Yes 0.17 
Sex 1 = male; 0 = female No 0.52 
Race 
   White 1 = non-Hispanic White; 0 = Black or Hispanic No 0.54 
Black 1 = non-Hispanic Black; 0 = Other No 0.28 
Hispanic 1 = Hispanic; 0 = Other No 0.18 
Marital Status 
   Never Married 1 = never married; 0 = other Yes 0.49 
Married 1 = married; 0 = other Yes 0.39 
Separated, Divorced, or 
Widowed 1 = separated, divorced, or widowed; 0 = other Yes 0.11 
Urbanicity 
   Central City 1 = lives in a central city; 0 = other Yes 0.45 
Not in Central City, in SMSA 1 = lives in SMSA but not in a central city; 0 = other Yes 0.38 
Not in SMSA 1 = does not live in a SMSA; 0 = other Yes 0.17 
Region of Residence 
  
0.18 
Northeast 1 = lives in Northeast; 0 = other Yes 0.24 
North Central 1 = lives in North Central; 0 = other Yes 0.39 
South 1 = lives in South; 0 = other Yes 0.19 
West 1 = lives in West; o = other Yes 
 
Mother's Education 
Number of years of education completed by 
respondent's mother No 11.02 
Father's Education 
Number of years of education completed by 
respondent's father No 10.95 
Within Sibling Differences 
   
Aptitude 
Respondent's AFQT score, renormed in 2006 and 
divided by 10 No 40.8 
Underage Alcohol Use 
1 = started consuming alcohol at least once per week 
before the age of 18; 0 = did not start consuming 
alcohol once per week before the age of 18 No 0.27 
Underage Tobacco Use 
1 = started smoking before the age of 18, conditional 
on smoking at least 100 cigarettes; 0 = did not start 
smoking before 18 No 0.31 
Teen Pregnancy 
1 = became a mother or father before the age of 18; 
0=did not become a parent until after the age of 18 No 0.12 
Oldest Sibling 1 = oldest sibling ; 0 = other No 0.41 
Note: N=9,270 
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(South, Northeast, Midwest, West). These additional covariates serve two purposes. First, they 
help ensure that observed differences between dropouts and high school graduates are not due to 
demographic differences in the two populations. Second, they help establish a baseline estimate 
for comparing between family estimates and within family estimates. Summary statistics and 
descriptions of the coding for each of these variables are presented in Table 2.1.  
Analytic Strategy 
To understand the relationship between dropping out and future poverty and welfare receipt, we 
must account for background effects that influence both the odds of dropping out and future risk 
of economic hardship. At issue is the nonrandom selection into dropping out. The decision to 
dropout is not independent of background characteristics. Models that omit background 
characteristics may produce biased estimates of future disadvantage.  
 Traditionally, researchers attempt to account for selection into dropping out through the 
use of controls in regression models. For example, poverty status for individual i in family f (Yif) 
is a function of dropout status (Xif), a vector of observed controlled variables (Zif), a family-
specific error term (!f), and a random error term (!if), giving the equation:  
[Equation 1] (Yif) = ! Xif  +  ! Zif  + !f  + !if 
When we estimate Equation 1, ! will estimate the impact of dropping out on poverty status net 
of social background characteristics. However, the dropout effect will be biased if there is a 
correlation between dropping out (Xif) and unobserved family characteristics (!f). By basing 
model estimation on variation within families only, sibling fixed-effects offer the ability to 
account for unobserved background characteristics and a means to separate background effects 
from dropout effects.  
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 For example, assume a family has two children, Sibling A and Sibling B. Let Y1f be the 
poverty status for Sibling A, Y2f be the poverty status for Sibling B, X1f and X2f is dropout status 
for each sibling respectively, Z1f and Z2f are a vector of observed control variables, !1f and !2f are 
individual specific error terms, and !f is a family specific error term.  The equation for Sibling A 
is 
(Equation 2)  Y1f = ! X1f  + ! Z1f + !f  + !1f 
The equation for Sibling B is 
(Equation 3)  Y2f = ! X2f  + ! Z2f + !f  + !2f 
If we subtract Equation 3 from Equation 2, we are left with 
(Equation 4)  Y1f – Y2f = ! (X1f – X2f) + ! (Z1f – Z2f) + !1f  + !2f 
Therefore, Equation 4 removes the family and neighborhood background characteristics shared 
by siblings, leaving sibling differences in poverty status as a function of dropping out of high 
school. In effect, because siblings experience the same neighborhoods, families, and other social 
backgrounds, we are able to account for these effects without observing, measuring, or 
operationalizing them, which means the dropout effect is not biased by unobserved 
heterogeneity.  
Researchers have used sibling fixed-effect models in a number of studies to address 
potential biases created by nonrandom allocation to different groups, such as the consequences of 
teenage pregnancy (experienced a teenage pregnancy versus did not experience a teenage 
pregnancy) (Bronars & Grogger 1994; Geronimus & Korenman 1992; Rosenzweig & Wolpin 
1995), returns to Head Start participation (attended Head Start versus did not attend Head Start) 
(Currie & Thomas 1995), and the impact of neighborhoods on educational outcomes (living in 
different neighborhoods) (Aaronson 1998). However, it is important to note two limitations of 
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the family fixed-effects estimator. First, siblings are seldom the same age, and thus may 
experience different social contexts. For example, family income or parenting styles may change 
over time. If these differences are correlated with dropping out, this could bias the dropout effect. 
Second, there may be differences among siblings that are correlated with dropping out. This has 
the potential to bias the dropout effect; however, to the extent that these differences are observed 
(such as including a proxy for scholastic aptitude as measured by standardized test scores), we 
can reduce this potential bias. Accordingly, I include measures of within family differences.      
 Additionally, because the outcomes of interest—poverty status and welfare receipt—are 
nonlinear and discrete variables, some fixed-effects strategies are not viable. Specifically, in a 
non-linear fixed-effects model, the number of nuisance parameters grows as sample size 
increases, which produces biased covariate estimates. This is known as the incidental parameter 
problem. Consequently, I estimate both Chamberlain’s (1980) conditional logistic and linear 
probability models. The Chamberlain model estimates logistic fixed-effects using conditional 
likelihood functions, which excludes all siblings that do not vary on poverty or welfare status. 
The linear probability model, while adding ease of interpretation, produces predicted 
probabilities that are not constrained between 0 and 1. As is common, I present the results from 
the linear probability models.  
Note that in the in the conventional OLS estimates I correct standard errors for household 
clustering. For the sibling fixed-effects, I correct standard errors for clustering within individuals 
and households. 
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Figure 2.1 Weighted Poverty Rate and Rate of Welfare Receipt by Dropout Status, 1970-2010. 
 
Note: Data from March Supplements of Current Population Survey, 1970-2010. For Panel A, n=3,785,905. For 
Panel B; n=3,488,487. Percentages are weighted to reflect cross-sectional national averages. 
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Findings 
Figure 1 displays the percent poor and percent receiving welfare by dropout status from 
1970-2010. In the top panel of Figure 1, Panel A, we see a sizable gap in poverty rates between 
dropouts and high school graduates. The trends in poverty rate largely mirror each other and the 
overall difference in poverty has changed little since the 1970s. In the bottom panel of Figure 1, 
Panel B, we see a large gap in the rate of welfare receipt between dropouts and high school 
graduates that narrows substantially over time. However, most of the narrowing occurs 
immediately following welfare reform in the mid-1990s and continues through 2010. Clearly, 
dropouts face an increased risk of poverty and welfare receipt, but would the risk of poverty or 
welfare receipt be eliminated if dropouts had completed high school? 
 Table 2.2 reports estimates of the effect of dropping out of high school on future poverty. 
Columns 1 through 4 present coefficients from conventional estimates (Equation 1). The first 
model estimates a baseline dropout effect and controls only for cohort. We see that dropping out 
increases the probability of living in poverty by 29 percent. Next, I add a set of standard 
demographic covariates (Column 2). These demographic covariates reduce the dropout effect 
slightly. The dropout effect decreases by 15 percent, but the effect remains large and significant. 
I next add controls for AFQT score (Column 3) and other background covariates (Column 4). 
The addition of these covariates reduces the dropout effect substantially. Once sibling order, 
parent education, scholastic aptitude, delinquency measures, and teen pregnancy are added to the 
model, the dropout effect is reduced by an additional 37 percent. However, most of this reduction 
is attributable to differences in scholastic aptitude. By not completing high school, dropouts 
increase the probability of living in poverty by 16 percent. The other covariates in the model 
report consistent and expected findings: women face a higher risk of poverty than men; blacks 
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and Hispanics face a higher risk of poverty than whites; increases in AFQT score are associated 
with a lower risk of poverty; delinquency is associated with an increased risk of poverty; teen 
parenthood increases the risk of poverty.   
 Column 5, Column 6, and Column 7 present coefficients from sibling fixed-effects 
estimates (Equation 4). In Column 5, I account for only demographic covariates. In Column 6, I 
account for demographic covariates and sibling differences in AFQT. In Column 7, I account for 
additional sibling differences that may influence dropping out—alcohol use during high school, 
tobacco use during high school, and becoming a parent during high school. When only 
demographic variations are accounted for, dropping out increases the likelihood of living in 
poverty by 14 percent. Once sibling differences in aptitude, delinquency, and parenthood are 
modeled, the dropout effect is reduced to 11 percent (Column 7). Importantly, differences in 
scholastic aptitudes are associated with only a minimal change in the likelihood of poverty. The 
differences between the full random effects estimates presented in Column 4 and the full fixed-
effects estimates presented in Column 7 demonstrate the difficulty of capturing background 
effects with proxy measures for social background and also reveal that traditional estimates 
overstate the effects of dropping out on poverty.  
 Table 2.3 reports estimates of the effect of dropping out on welfare receipt. I follow the 
same modeling strategy outlined above, first estimating four conventional models and then three 
sibling fixed-effects models. In the baseline model, Column 1, we see that dropping out of high 
school increases the likelihood of receiving welfare by 8 percent. Once basic demographic 
covariates are accounted for (Column 2), the dropout effect is largely unchanged. Controlling for 
scholastic aptitude (Column 3) results in a decrease in the likelihood of receipt of public 
assistance by 21 percent. The addition of other background covariates (Column 4) reduces 
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the dropout effect substantially. Compared to the model that omits background covariates 
(Column 3), the full model reduces the likelihood of receiving public assistance by 45 percent. 
By not completing high school, dropouts increase their probability of receiving welfare by 4 
percent. 
 Columns 5, 6, and 7 of Table 2.3 report estimates of the probability of receiving welfare 
from sibling fixed-effects models. Here we see consistency between the conventional and sibling 
fixed-effects estimates. When we first account for only demographics in Column 4, we see that 
dropping out increases the likelihood of welfare receipt by just over 4 percent. When we account 
for differences in scholastic aptitude (Column 6), the likelihood of welfare receipt changes little. 
Once we add measures of within-family heterogeneity (Column 7), the dropout effect is reduced 
to less than 3 percent. The random and fixed-effects estimates from Columns 4 and 7 differ 
modestly. Unobserved background effects play only a minor role in the probability of welfare 
receipt for high school dropouts.   
 The above results indicate that dropping out of high school has a significant and 
important effect on future poverty and welfare receipt. However, it is possible that the dropout 
effect and the role of background characteristics have changed over time. Accordingly, I run the 
analyses separately by cohort to examine possible differential effects.  
 Table 2.4 shows estimates of the effect of dropping out on future poverty for the older 
cohort only, and Table 2.5 shows estimates of the effect of dropping out on future welfare receipt 
for the older cohort only. For both tables, I follow the same modeling strategy as reported in 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3. In the baseline model (Column 1), we see that dropping out increases 
the probability of poverty by close to 30 percent. Once demographic covariates are added to the 
model (Column 2), the risk of poverty for dropouts decreases modestly. Differences in scholastic 
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ability reduce the risk of poverty substantially (31 percent), and the full set of observed 
background covariates further reduces the risk of poverty. In the full model, the risk of poverty 
for dropouts is 16 percent. In Column 5, Column 6, and Column 7, I report estimates from the 
sibling fixed-effects models. When we only account for demographic covariates, the risk of 
poverty is 14 percent for high school dropouts. When we add sibling differences in scholastic 
ability to the model, the risk of poverty is reduced to 12 percent. When we add sibling 
differences in alcohol use, tobacco use, and teen parenthood to the model, the risk of poverty is 
reduced to 11 percent. Importantly, we observe notable differences between the random effects 
estimate and the sibling fixed-effects estimate, indicating that unobserved background 
characteristics are biasing the dropout effect.  
 We observe a similar pattern for the effect of dropping out on welfare receipt for the 
older cohort (Table 2.5). In the baseline model, dropping out increases the risk of welfare by 9 
percent for the older cohort. Accounting for demographic covariates does little, but the full set of 
background covariates reduces the risk to fewer than 5 percent. The sibling fixed-effects models 
report modestly lower estimates of the effect of dropping out. In the full sibling fixed-effects 
model, dropping out increases the risk of welfare receipt by 3 percent. The minimal differences 
between estimates presented in Columns 4 and 7 of Table 2.5 again indicate that the dropout 
effect on welfare is only biased minimally by unobserved background characteristics.  
 However, for the younger cohort, we observe notable differences in the effect of 
dropping out on future poverty and welfare receipt, reported in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 
respectively. In particular, in Column 4 of Table 2.6, we see that the risk of poverty for high 
school dropouts is a little over 12 percent. In Column 7, we see a significant difference in the 
sibling fixed-effect estimates. Whereas estimates from the conventional and fixed-effect 
   45 
estimates were more similar for the older cohort, the sibling fixed-effects estimate is 
substantially different for the younger cohort. Once unobserved background characteristics and 
sibling differences are modeled, the risk of poverty is a little over 6 percent, nearly half of the 
conventional estimate.  
 The findings reported in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 have three important implications. First, 
for the younger cohort, estimates of the dropout effect are biased by unobserved heterogeneity. 
While dropping out still increases the risk of poverty for the younger cohort, much of the risk 
comes from unobserved differences between dropouts and high school graduates. Second, 
background characteristics that lead to dropping out are becoming more important in determining 
poverty across cohorts. Third, the effect of dropping out on poverty is decreasing over time.  
 We also see important differences between cohorts in the risk of welfare receipt for 
dropouts. In the conventional models, the risk of welfare receipt for dropouts in the younger 
cohort goes from over 4 percent in the baseline model to under 2 percent in the full model. The 
dropout effect in the full model, however, approaches statistical significance but is not 
statistically significant. Estimates from conventional models are significantly lower for the 
younger cohort compared to the older cohort, and estimates from the sibling fixed-effects are not 
statistically significant. For the younger cohort, differences in rate of welfare receipt among high 
school dropouts are minimal and largely due to unobserved characteristics.
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 Lastly, to further compare the risk of poverty for high school dropouts across cohorts, I 
include a final set of models (Table 2.8). In these models, I examine the risk of poverty for the 
older cohort, limiting the sample to the years where respondents are below the age of 30—the 
oldest age where data are available for the younger cohort. This set of models allows me to 
compare the risk of poverty for the older and younger cohorts during the same age range. 
Overall, we observe a pattern similar to the previously reported findings. The dropout effect is 
larger for the older cohort even when limited to the same age range. A t-test confirms that the 
observed differences in the risk of poverty are statistically different across cohorts in a one tailed 
test at .05 or at .10 in a two tailed test (t =1.71) Moreover, even when the sample is restricted for 
younger ages for the older cohort, the unobserved background covariates explain less of the 
difference between the conventional estimates and sibling fixed-effects estimates. This further 
suggests that unobserved covariates are more influential for the younger cohort. 
Discussion 
There is widespread public concern about the economic fate of dropouts. These concerns 
are well intentioned, but lack empirical support because of the difficulties of estimating an 
unbiased dropout effect. Dropouts differ from high school graduates in more ways than just a 
high school diploma, and researchers must be careful to account for these differences or they run 
the risk of misattributing background effects to dropout effects. 
 In this study, I present both conventional regression estimates and sibling fixed-effects 
estimates on the effect of dropping out on poverty and welfare receipt, a surprisingly 
understudied topic. The conventional estimates are inline with cross-sectional results, noting a 
strong effect of dropping out on poverty and welfare receipt that is nearly halved by controlling 
for a relatively limited set of demographic and social background covariates. The sibling fixed-
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effects estimates attenuate this finding: when model estimation is based on within-family 
differences, I find smaller estimates of the consequences of dropping out on future poverty and 
welfare receipt. However, the dropout effect remains substantial and significant. The 
implications of this are clear and important: by not completing high school, dropouts are 
increasing the probability of experiencing poverty and receiving welfare.  
The research presented here also unearths an important temporal change in the 
consequences of dropping out. For the older cohort, those who were high school age in the 
1970s, the conventional estimates and sibling fixed-effects estimates are more closely aligned. 
For the younger cohort, those who were high school age in the 1990s, we observe large 
differences between the conventional and within-family estimates.   
For the younger cohort, conventional estimates substantially overstate the cost of 
dropping out. Unobserved background characteristics are important and are able to explain 
nearly half of the increased probability of poverty among dropouts and completely explain away 
the increased probability of welfare. While cohort difference in welfare receipt among dropouts 
is likely due to welfare reform, a takeaway remains: for the younger cohort, once unobserved 
background characteristics are accounted for, dropouts are no more likely to receive welfare than 
high school graduates. 
However, it remains to be seen if this disparity across cohorts persists. The NLSY97 
cohort is only in early adulthood in the most recent survey years. It is possible that over time the 
conventional and sibling fixed-effects estimates will converge and more closely resemble the 
estimates of the older cohort. 
If the estimates do not converge over time, then we will need to reconsider our 
understanding of how educational attainment influences outcomes and also how social scientists 
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attempt to measure the effects of educational attainment. For the older cohort, the bias in the 
conventional estimates is minimal. This is consistent with other work that attempts to measure 
the amount of bias in OLS estimates of educational effects on earnings (Card 1999). For the 
younger cohort, if the gap between the within family estimates and between family estimates 
remains large, social scientists will have more difficulty estimating the effects of educational 
attainment.  
These findings have important policy implications. If unobserved background 
characteristics explained the differences in the increased likelihood of poverty or welfare receipt 
among dropouts, then policies aimed solely at increasing graduation rates would be misguided. 
Instead, policies would need to address the background determinants that make dropouts differ 
from high school graduates. This would create a difficult task for policymakers—policies aimed 
at family changes are more challenging than policies aimed at school changes. However, this is 
not the case. A dropout effect remains even after accounting for unobserved differences. Thus, 
policies that are able to increase graduation rates should reduce the rate of poverty among 
students who would have dropped out otherwise.  
Recent education reforms largely push for an increase in standards and added 
requirements for high school graduation. The findings presented here support past calls for a 
careful reconsideration of how to balance improving the quality of education without increasing 
the dropout rate (Alexander et al 1985; McDill et al 1986). Consider high school exit 
examinations. Approximately two-thirds of all American high school students must pass an exit 
examination to earn their diploma (Warren 2007). High school exit examinations are no doubt 
well intentioned and there are many good reasons to ensure that high school graduates meet 
certain skills and knowledge requirements; however, high school exit examinations also increase 
   55 
dropout rates among low-ability students (Jacob 2001). Students who would have completed 
high school if not for the exit examination now face an increased risk of poverty.   
Finally, the results indicate that a large portion of the disparity between high school 
graduates and high school dropouts is explained by social and economic background. This 
speaks to the limit of schools and also supports recent shifts in anti-poverty policies that focus on 
intervention at the community level (e.g. Promise Neighborhoods and Promise Zones). Efforts to 
improve the socioeconomic position of high school dropouts do not need to be limited to 
classroom walls. 
 This study also suggests potentially fruitful avenues for future research. First, this 
research shows cohort differences in the consequences of dropping out, but is unable to speak to 
the source of these differences. Over the past forty years, the labor market has changed 
dramatically, seeing a large growth in job precarity (Kalleberg 2011). Thus, it seems likely that 
changes in the labor market drive cohort differences; however, additional research is needed. 
Additionally, this research demonstrates that dropping out has an effect on poverty independent 
of background characteristics, but does not address the root cause of this difference. What is it 
about dropping out? Is it the loss of a credential? Diminished human capital and skills? Research 
that explicitly tests the mechanisms that lead from dropping out to poverty is needed. Lastly, 
while the effect of dropping out on poverty and welfare receipt is understudied, the effect of 
dropping out on other social outcomes is common. In particular, a large body of research 
examines the effects of dropping out on crime. The analytic strategy and findings presented in 
this study offer a potentially productive line of investigation for criminologists interested in the 
relationship between dropping out and crime.       
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CHAPTER 3: SIBSHIP SIZE, COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT, AND EARLY 
EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT IN LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
 
 
Introduction 
Household income is positively related to cognitive development and educational 
achievement. Compared to children who grow up in more affluent households, children in low-
income households have a smaller vocabulary on the first day of kindergarten, (Farkas & Beron 
2004; Hart & Risley 1995), score worse on standardized tests (Reardon 2011), are less likely to 
graduate from high school (Alexander, Entwisle, & Kabbani 2001), and are less likely to attend 
college (Deil-Amen & Lopez Turley 2007). Past research has identified an array of community 
level and family factors that contribute to these cognitive development and educational 
achievement gaps. At the neighborhood level, poverty, crime, and culture are all strong 
determinants of educational achievement (Brooks-Gunn et al 1993; Duncan et al 1994; Crowder 
& South 2001; Harding 2003, 2011). At the household level, parental education, financial 
resources, and parenting practices have a strong influence on outcomes (Astone & McLanahan 
1991; Bradley & Caldwell 1984; Harris & Marmer 1996; McLeod & Shanahan 1993; McNeal 
1999; Parcel & Menaghan 1994). While this line of research has proved fruitful, existing 
research overlooks the possible role of sibship size, a common explanation for variations in 
cognitive development and educational achievement.  
On average, low-income households have more children than affluent households. The 
consequences of this are unclear. There are compelling theoretical reasons to believe that 
increases in sibship size impede cognitive development and educational achievement for children 
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in low-income households. However, empirical evidence is wanting. Past research shows a clear 
relationship between sibship size and cognitive development and educational achievement in 
general, but the findings are incomplete because (1) they may not apply to low-income 
households and (2) they do not adequately account for selection effects. This study addresses 
both of these shortcomings and has important implications for our understanding of income-
based achievement gaps. Specifically, if increases in sibship size negatively affect cognitive 
development and educational achievement, then sibship size should help inform our 
understanding of achievement gaps in the same way that neighborhood effects, school effects, 
and other family effects do.  
 Additionally, in this study I compare sibship size effects in low-income households and 
more affluent households, asking if the consequences of increases in sibship size vary across 
household contexts. Ultimately, this study examines two questions. First, would low-income 
children have better cognitive and education outcomes if they had fewer siblings? Second, do 
sibship size effects vary between low-income and affluent households? In turn, this study 
contributes to our understanding of how sibship size affects the achievement gap and improves 
our understanding of the contexts in which sibship size influences cognitive development and 
educational achievement. 
Background 
A negative association between sibship size and cognitive development and educational 
achievement is well documented (Anastasi 1956; Blake 1981, 1985, 1989; Cicirelli 1978; 
Downey 1995, 2001; Featherman & Hauser 1978; Jaeger 2009; Mare & Chen 1986; Park 2008; 
Powell & Steelman 1993; Steelman 1985; Steelman, Powell, Werum & Carter 2002; Xu 2008). 
The size of the effect varies across studies and across outcomes—Blau & Duncan (1967) found 
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that each sibling was associated with a 0.2-year decrease in schooling; Blake (1989) found that 
each sibling was associated with a decrease on standardized tests by one-tenth of a standard 
deviation—but is consistently negative in western settings. This relationship is often discussed in 
terms of a “quality-quantity tradeoff,” where increases in sibship size (quantity) result in 
decreases in child capacities (quality) (Becker & Lewis 1974). The prevailing explanation points 
to resource dilution. Specifically, the resource dilution hypothesis argues that as sibship size 
increases, parental resources become strained (Blake 1981, 1989; Downey 1995, 2001). This line 
of thinking sees parents as investing money, time, attention, and support in their children. To the 
extent that each child requires individual investments, the more children there are in a household, 
the more constrained resources become. Ultimately, the resource dilution hypothesis argues that 
children with many siblings suffer a cognitive and education penalty because of the thinning of 
available resources across all siblings.   
 However, the applicability of sibship size effects to different social and economic 
contexts is uncertain. Comparative research shows that the negative relationship between sibship 
size and educational achievement is found in other OECD countries (Park 2008; Xu 2008); but 
the association between sibship size and education is weak in Vietnam (Anh et al 1998) and 
varies by time period in China (Lu & Treiman 2008). Moreover, sibship size has a positive effect 
on educational achievement in Kenya (Buchmann 2000; Gomes 1984), Botswana (Chernicovsky 
1985), and Brazil through the mid-1990s (Marteleto & Souza 2012). The comparative findings 
are illustrative, showing how sibling relationships, parental investments and expectations, family 
dynamics, and the cost of raising children vary by setting and time period. For example, Gomes 
(1984) suggests that in Kenya it is possible that older children in a household provide resources 
for their younger siblings. In short, context matters and it is easy to imagine how differences in 
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social and economic contexts across low-income and affluent households could yield differences 
in sibship size effects in the US.  
While research shows a strong association between sibship size and cognitive 
development and educational achievement in the US and other Western settings, it is unclear 
whether this finding extends to low-income households. In low-income households, the potential 
for resource strain is acute. The financial constraints are obvious: families with less money have 
less to spend per child than more affluent households. However, in low-income households 
increases in sibship size and investment in children may have an economies of scale not found in 
more affluent households. Because financial resources are limited, the per child loss is likely 
smaller than in more affluent households. For example, consider childcare. High quality center-
based childcare has short and long term benefits (Bainbridge et al 2005; Belsky et al 2007; Loeb 
et al 2004; Phillips & Lowenstein 2011), and childcare centers in general provide a better 
education than informal and home-based childcare that is available in poor neighborhoods 
(Fuller et al 2004). In more affluent households, an additional sibling may cost a child high 
quality center-based childcare. In poor households, high quality center-based childcare is likely 
not an option regardless of sibship size.  
Similarly, in the areas where low-income households are able to financially invest in 
child development, it is possible that they see greater per child returns to that investment. 
Kaushal, Magnuson, and Waldfogel (2011) find that an increase in income for families in the 
bottom income quintile is followed by an increase in spending on child enrichment items. More 
than one child can share enrichment items like books and toys; more than one child cannot share 
high quality center-based childcare or experiential enrichment activities like music lessons or 
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ballet lessons. This suggests that increases in sibship size may impose less of a penalty in low-
income households when compared to middle-income households.  
Moreover, Kornrich and Furstenberg (2013) find that there is a common floor for 
monetary investment in children. Households in the poorest three deciles of the income 
distribution spend similar dollar amounts on their children as middle-income households. Thus, 
increases in sibship size should at worst impose a financial constraint that is similar across low-
income and middle-income households and at best is less detrimental in low-income households 
because of economies of scale not found in middle-income and more affluent households.   
However, while increases in sibship size may only produce a modest financial burden in 
low-income households, increases in sibship size may levy an additional imposition on time that 
is not found in affluent households. Many low-income and single parent families rely heavily on 
social support networks (Dominguez & Watkins 2003; Heflin et al 2011; Jackson 1998; Stack 
1974), and rely on social support networks—kin in particular—to provide significant amounts of 
childcare (Kisker & Ross 1997). Recent research shows notable variations in the amount of 
social support received by families. Harknett and Hartnett (2011) show that families with a large 
number of children are less likely to receive childcare support through social networks, arguing 
that the burden of providing support is a determinant of the type and amount of support offered. 
In effect, offering childcare assistance to a family with two children is less of an imposition than 
offering childcare to a family with three children. Larger sibship size could cost low-income 
households social support. 
Research on the psychological costs of economic hardship is similarly relevant. First, 
economic hardship influences family relationships and emotional investments. In short, 
economic hardship is stressful and this stress spills over to family dynamics (Brody et al 1994; 
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Elder 1974; Elder et al 1992; Harris & Marmer 1996; McLeod & Kessler 1990). Second, 
attention is a finite resource (Luck & Vogel 1997). Mani et al (2013) propose that economic 
hardship overburdens the cognitive system. Specifically, because the poor must constantly 
consider expenses, budgets, and economic tradeoffs, they are left with fewer cognitive resources. 
Thus, attention is limited by economic hardship, further reducing available resources for parents 
in low-income households to offer their children. In effect, when a new sibling is added to a 
household, parents may have a smaller pool of available attention to draw on. Taken together, 
these lines of research suggest—when compared to more affluent households—siblings in low-
income households are competing for attention and support that are heavily taxed by economic 
conditions. Economic hardship does not only limit available financial resources, it also limits 
available psychological resources. 
Lastly, in evaluating sibship size effects in different eras of Chinese economic 
development, Lu and Treiman (2008) note that when educational opportunities are limited, 
sibship size is unlikely to matter—resource dilution is not a concern if opportunities do not exist. 
We can extend this reasoning to low-income households in the US. Children in low-income 
households face a number of challenges. These challenges may outweigh any effects sibship size 
could have. For example, the physical environment of the home influences learning outcomes 
(Brooks-Gunn et al 1995), and poor children are much more likely to live in unsafe and 
overcrowded homes (Mayer 1997), to live in neighborhoods with high crime rates (Massey 
1996), and to live in homes that lack cognitive stimulation (Guo & Harris 2000). Sibship size 
may not matter in low-income households because educational opportunities are already limited. 
Determining whether sibship size matters in low-income households is not an easy task. 
Research on sibship size effects in general is dogged by a lingering question over causality. 
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Much of the debate over causality stems from inadequate data and methods. Existing research on 
sibship size largely relies on cross-sectional data and OLS regression, which may not be able to 
successfully identify the effect of sibship size. In particular, sibship size, because it reflects 
parental choices, is endogenous. Put simply, parents that have more children are likely different 
from parents that have fewer children. Consequently, any dilution of resources that may occur 
with increases in sibship size may have no bearing on the cognitive and education outcomes of 
children. These nuances are difficult to pickup with snapshot data and OLS regression. 
 However, rather than quell debate, the availability of longitudinal data and improved 
methods has further stoked disagreement about the causality of sibship size effects. For example, 
Guo and VanWey (1999) use an innovative sibling fixed-effects model that calls into question 
the causal interpretation of sibship size. However, Downey et al (1999) dispute this finding as 
relying on overly conservative methods and mistaking the absence of sibling spacing effects as 
the absence of sibship size effects. Specifically, because of data limitations, Guo and VanWey 
used an analytic sample that only included widely spaced siblings.  
More recent studies have attempted to account for selection into sibship size through the 
use of exogenous variables and have similarly produced conflicting findings. Several studies use 
twin births to isolate the effect of sibship size on education and cognitive outcomes, with some 
reporting that the effect of sibship size on educational attainment is not significantly different 
from zero (Angrist, Lavy, & Schlosser 2010), others noting small but significant effects of 
sibship size on private school enrollment (Caceres-Delpiano 2006), and others finding modest 
effects on cognitive test scores (Black et al 2010). In an analogous line of investigation, 
researchers have used sibling sex composition to isolate the effect of sibship size, noting parents 
who have two children that are both boys or girls are more likely to have a third child than 
  68 
parents who have a boy and a girl. These studies conclude that sibship size has a small effect on 
the likelihood of attending private school and repeating a grade in school (Conley & Glauber 
2005) but no effect on cognitive test scores (Black et al 2010). I build on these previous analyses, 
focusing on comparisons across different levels of household disadvantage and using a different 
source of exogenous variation in sibship size—whether the mother of a household experiences a 
miscarriage. 
Data and Measures 
I draw data from Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, a longitudinal study following a 
birth cohort of nearly 5,000 children born in 75 hospitals across 20 different US cities with 
populations greater than 200,000 (For detailed information on the study design, see Reichman, 
Teitler, Garfinkel, & McLanahan 2001). The Fragile Families data are advantageous for a 
number of reasons. In particular, the study was designed specifically for the purpose of 
examining how economic disadvantage shapes child wellbeing. Consequently, the data include a 
large sample of children born into low-income households and also a comparison sample of 
children born into affluent households. Longitudinal studies of low-income households are often 
limited by a lack of statistical power. This is not the case with Fragile Families. Moreover, 
Fragile Families provides rich data on social and economic contexts in both low-income and 
affluent households, and also detailed measures of cognitive development and educational 
achievement. Importantly, Fragile Families includes measure of cognitive development (PPVT 
score) and early educational achievement (first grade promotion) that are used in past research on 
sibship size effects (e.g. Conley & Glauber 2005; Guo & VanWey 1999).  
I create two separate analytic samples, (1) a sample of low-income households and (2) a 
sample of affluent households. To obtain a sample of low-income households, I limit the sample 
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to children born into households with an income less than two times the poverty threshold. To 
obtain a sample of more affluent households, I limit the sample to children born into households 
with an income two times or more the poverty threshold. Baseline data were collected between 
1998 and 2000. Follow up waves occurred after one year, three years, and five years (t1, t3, and 
t5). Data were collected about the focal children, mothers, and fathers. Mothers and fathers were 
interviewed separately. Additionally, the kindergarten teacher of the focal child was interviewed 
at t5. 
   
Outcome Variables. Measures of educational achievement are only available at t5. Measures of 
cognitive development are available at both t3 and t5; however, to isolate the effect sibship size 
through the use of instrumental variable estimation, I only use cognitive development measures 
at t5. This is explained in greater detail in the Analytic Strategy section of this paper.  
To assess cognitive ability, I use the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT), a 
regularly used measure of intellectual development. To assess educational achievement, I use 
two measures of school performance. The first measure is a reference variable for whether the 
child was promoted from kindergarten to first grade (1 = promoted; 0 = was not promoted) as 
reported by the child’s kindergarten teacher. The second measure is an additive scale composed 
of the child’s kindergarten teacher’s assessment of the child’s ability in three areas—language 
and literacy, science and social studies, and mathematics. For each item, teachers could select (1) 
Far Below Average, (2) Below Average, (3) Average, (4) Above Average, (5) Far Above 
Average. Higher scores on the scale indicate greater educational achievement. The scale has a 
Cronbach’s ! of .8941. Note that the subset of kindergarten teachers who completed the survey is 
smaller than the full sample. 
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Sibship Size. Sibship size is measured as the number of children residing in the household at t5. 
This includes all children, not just biological brothers and sisters. I select this measure of sibship 
size—as opposed to a measure that limited sibship size to siblings who share the same mother 
and father—because it is most consistent with social theory: all children in a household draw on 
available resources, not just those related through a common mother and father.  
 
Miscarriage. At t1, t3, and t5 mothers are asked if they have experienced a miscarriage since the 
previous interview. I use this question to create a reference variable for whether a mother 
experienced a miscarriage between baseline and t1 and between t1 and t3. I include only 
miscarriages that occurred between the baseline survey year and t3 because cognitive and 
education outcomes are measured at t5. Accordingly, miscarriages that occurred between t3 and 
t5 would not necessarily have affected sibship size prior to the measurement of the outcome 
variables. This variable and its uses are discussed in more detail in the Analytic Strategy section.  
 
Additional Covariates.  I also include a range of demographic and background variables that are 
related to child educational achievement (whether the mother completed high school, the number 
of years the child was in poverty between birth and t5, the household income-to-poverty ratio at 
the time of the child’s birth) or a strong predictor of sibship size  (whether the child is part of a 
twin birth, whether the mother identifies as Catholic, whether the child is the mother’s first child, 
whether the parents of the child are married or cohabiting from birth through t5). Importantly, 
these demographic and background variables are also used as observed covariates of sibship size 
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in the matching analysis. This is discussed in more detail in the Analytic Strategy section. 
Summary statistics and a description of all variables are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 Table 3.1. Description and Summary Statistics of All Variables.  
Variable Description Mean Min Max SD 
PPVT 
Standardized score on Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test at t5 93.06 40 139 15.78 
Promoted to First Grade 
Kindergarten teacher report of whether child was 
promoted from kindergarten to first grade 0.88 0 1 
 
Ed. Achievement Scale 
Indexed scale of kindergarten teacher's assessment 
of child's language and literacy, science and social 
studies, and mathematical skills 9.03 3 15 2.32 
Sibship Size Number of siblings living in the household at t5 2.54 1 6 1.23 
Miscarriage 
Whether mother of household experience a 
miscarriage between birth of child and t3 0.09 0 1 
 First Child Whether the focal child is the first born 0.38 0 1 
 Twins Whether the focal child is part of a twin birth 0.02 0 1 
 Catholic Whether the mother is Catholic 0.25 0 1 
 Mother High School 
Grad Whether mother of child completed high school 0.63 0 1 
 
Parents Live Together 
Whether parents of child are married or cohabiting 
from birth through t5 0.31 0 1 
 Poverty Ratio at Birth Income-to-poverty ratio at birth 1.94 0 9.9 1.85 
Time in Poverty Time in poverty between birth and t5 1.65 0 4 1.49 
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Analytic Strategy 
OLS and Logistic Regression 
Would poor children fare better if they had fewer siblings? Or, to phrase this as a 
counterfactual, if a poor child had one fewer sibling, would her education and cognitive 
outcomes improve? I first estimate a basic linear model:  
(Equation 1) ! ! !! ! !" ! !! 
where Y is a cognitive or education outcome (e.g. PPVT score) and X is sibship size. We can 
assume that the effect of X (sibship size) on Y (PPVT score) is causal if X and ! are uncorrelated. 
If X and ! are correlated, then X will be biased. We are particularly concerned about unobserved 
factors that influence sibship size. Correlation between X and ! is often referred to as omitted 
variable bias. A potential solution is to elaborate Equation 1 by adding additional covariates. 
Accordingly, I include several control variables in these models, but without perfect data it is 
nearly impossible to remove the correlation between X and !. Thus, it is important to consider 
how the estimates of sibship size obtained using this model may be biased by omitted variables.  
Propensity Score Matching  
Following the conventional OLS estimates, I conduct a matching analysis. Propensity 
score matching models have a long history in the social sciences but are only recently becoming 
adopted by sociologists (Morgan and Harding 2006). To further examine the relationship 
between sibship size and cognitive and education outcomes, I perform a propensity score 
matching analysis where I compare different sibship sizes (i.e. 1 vs. 2 siblings, 2 vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, 4 
vs. 5, and 5 vs. 6). Propensity score matching compares like to like, maximizing efficiency and 
potentially improving causal inference (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1985; Smith 1997). In effect, I 
group households that are similar in all ways except sibship size. In the language of experimental 
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research, we can think of the control group as the smaller sibship size and the treatment group as 
the larger sibship size. For example, in households with two or three siblings, the households 
with two siblings are the control group and the households with three siblings are the treatment 
group. The control and treatment groups are matched on a variety of characteristics, and the 
propensity score reports the effect of having an additional sibling in the household.     
 There are two steps to the matching model. I first estimate a logistic regression model 
that generates a propensity score for sibship size for each respondent. The propensity score is the 
conditional probability that a respondent will be in the control or treatment group given a series 
of characteristics (mother’s education, mother’s age, mother’s religious affiliation, mother’s 
race/ethnicity, mother’s nativity status, mother’s relationship status, whether the child is part of a 
twin birth, whether mother experienced a miscarriage, the child’s poverty status at birth, the 
child’s poverty ratio at birth, and amount of time the child spent in poverty between birth and t5). 
I then use nearest neighbor matching to pair each treatment case with its closest control case, 
estimating the average treatment effect of having one additional sibling. 
 While likely an improvement over OLS estimates, the propensity score matching 
estimates may still be biased. Note that the accuracy of propensity score matching estimates 
hinge on the assumption that assignment to the control or treatment group is not biased by 
unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983). This is often referred to as “ignorable 
treatment assignment.” If assignment to the treatment or control group is not random and not 
accounted for by observed covariates, then estimates of the treatment effect will be biased. 
Consequently, because propensity score matching estimates rely on observed covariates, 
propensity score matching may not remove selection bias (Heckman et al 1996). Thus, it is again 
important to be cautious of the potential for omitted variable bias.  
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Miscarriage as a Quasi-Experiment and Instrumental Variable Estimation 
Lastly, I conduct a series of analyses where I treat miscarriages as a quasi-experiment. 
Consider an experimental design in which we are able to randomly assign households to control 
and treatment groups. In the control group, households expect an additional child and receive an 
additional child. In the treatment group, households expect an additional child but do not receive 
an additional child. With this experimental design, we could then compare outcomes for children 
living in the control and treatment households and isolate the effect of having an additional 
sibling.  
 A true experimental design as described above is not possible; however, miscarriages 
may provide analytic purchase. In the event of a miscarriage, a household expects an additional 
child but does not receive an additional child. Miscarriage accounts for selection into 
pregnancy—both women who carry a pregnancy to term and women who experience a 
miscarriage first become pregnant. Thus, if miscarriages are random, they could serve as a quasi-
experiment—we have a control group (children whose mothers became pregnant and an 
additional sibling was added to the household) and a treatment group (children whose mothers 
became pregnant but an additional sibling was not added to the household). 
 A body of research examines the potential correlates of miscarriage to evaluate whether 
miscarriages can be considered random, and largely contends that miscarriages can be treated as 
sufficient for a natural experiment (Hotz et al 1997). This is important. If assignment to the 
control or treatment group is not random, then observed treatment effects might be spurious. For 
example, if housing characteristics and miscarriage were strongly related, then observed 
differences may be due to differences in housing characteristics, not sibship size. However, there 
are other potential issues with treating miscarriages as random. First, miscarriages are often 
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underreported. Some women who experience a miscarriage may not report having a miscarriage. 
Second, some women who experience a miscarriage may have gone on to have an abortion had 
they not experienced a miscarriage. Third, even if the miscarriage event is random, miscarriages 
may have a lasting effect on mothers. For example, experiencing a miscarriage may lead to 
depression (Neugebauer et al 1997).  
 With these limitations in mind, I estimate two models. I first treat miscarriage as a true 
random event, estimating a basic experimental model:   
(Equation 2)  ! ! !! !!"#$%&&"%'(!! ! !!! ! !! 
where “miscarriage” is an indicator variable for whether the mother of a household experiences a 
miscarriage between the birth of the focal child and t3 and X is a vector of control variables. In 
effect, !!estimates the effect of having one fewer sibling than expected.    
Additionally, I use miscarriage as an instrumental variable (IV). Like propensity score 
matching, IV estimation has a long history in the social sciences, but is only recently becoming 
widely used in sociology (Morgan & Winship 2007) (see Kirk 2009; Lizardo 2006; Offer and 
Schneider 2007). IV estimation provides an effective solution to the biases created by omitted 
variables (Morgan & Winship 2007), a previously noted concern. Here we have reservations 
about selection into pregnancy—that households that have more children are different from 
households that have fewer children in ways that are difficult to measure using conventional 
methods. IV estimation relies on an instrumental variable, Z, which is correlated with the 
treatment variable (sibship size) and uncorrelated with the outcome variable (cognitive 
development or educational achievement). In the research presented here, whether the mother of 
a child experienced a miscarriage serves as an instrument. Thus, miscarriage serves as a 
“treatment effect,” and the IV estimate assesses the cognitive and education gains achieved by 
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having one fewer sibling—in effect, siblings in these households have one fewer sibling than 
expected because the mother of the household experienced a miscarriage. The IV estimate can be 
expressed as:  
(Equation 3) !!" ! !"#!!!!!!"#!!!!! ! !!"# !!! !!!"#!!!!!!!"#!!!!!  
Thus, because Cov(Y,Z) is equal to Cov(X,Z)!+Cov(!,Z); and, if Z and ! are uncorrelated, then 
Cov(!,Z) is equal to zero, the last expression of Equation 3 reduces to !. In effect, we can think 
of Z (miscarriage) as an exogenous shock to the effect of X (sibship size) on Y (cognitive and 
education outcomes). 
I specify a two-stage estimation process. In the first stage, I estimate the key explanatory 
variable (sibship size) as a function of the instrumental variable (miscarriage) and a vector of 
control variables (mother’s education, mother’s relationship status, mother’s age, mother’s 
religion), providing a predicted value of sibship size. In the second stage, I estimate the outcomes 
variables (cognitive ability and educational achievement) as a function of the predicted value of 
sibship size (obtained from the first stage of estimation) and a vector of control variables. In 
effect, Equation 1 is updated to:  
(Equation 4) ! ! !! ! !!! ! !! 
where X (sibship size) from Equation 1 is replaced with the predicted value of sibship size (!!.   
 Again, it is important to consider how well miscarriage serves as an instrument for 
sibship size. Numerous studies use miscarriage as an instrument for an array of social outcomes 
dealing with fertility and family size (e.g. Buckles & Munnich 2012; Fletcher & Wolfe 2011; 
Hotz, McElroy, & Sanders 1997, 2001; Levine, Clifton, & Pollack 2007; Robson & Pevalin 
2007), and miscarriage is even offered as an example instrument in calls for researchers to think 
more seriously about endogeneity (Moffitt 2005). The impressive number of studies that use 
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miscarriage as an instrument has led to some concerns about whether miscarriages satisfy the 
conditions of instrumental variable estimation. Of particular, concern is the possibility that 
miscarriage is related to unobserved covariates. If this is the case, the instrumental variable 
estimate will be biased.   
Table 3.2 shows variations in educational attainment, income-to-poverty ratio, time in 
poverty, family structure, and mother’s age by miscarriage status for low-income and affluent 
households. While the key assumption is that miscarriage is unrelated to unobserved covariates, 
by comparing across observed covariates, we can see the extent to which the two populations 
appear similar. Overall, we see some differences between women who experience a miscarriage 
and women who did not experience a miscarriage. In the low-income sample, women who 
experience a miscarriage are slightly less likely to be high school graduates, are modestly 
younger, have spent more time in poverty but have higher household incomes at t5, and are also 
less likely to be married or cohabiting. In the affluent sample, there are few differences in 
education or relationship status by miscarriage, but women who experience a miscarriage are 
younger and have a lower income-to-poverty ratio than women who did not experience a 
miscarriage. The overall similarities between the two populations provide some confidence that 
miscarriage is not a biased treatment, but there are observed differences. Again, while the key 
assumption is on unobserved covariates, it is reassuring that the two populations appear similar 
on observed covariates.  
Ultimately, IV estimates—like OLS estimates—are based on a number of assumptions. 
These assumptions force us to interpret the results with caution. However, to the extent that 
miscarriages satisfy the assumptions of IV estimation, we can be confident that the coefficients 
for sibship size accurately capture the effect of sibship size on education outcomes. If 
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miscarriage is uncorrelated with the cognitive development and early educational achievement of 
children in a household, and because miscarriage by definition accounts for unobserved factors 
that select women into pregnancy (women who miscarry must first become pregnant), then we 
can be confident that the mechanism is correctly identified. However, this does not speak to 
potential changes produced by a miscarriage. Specifically, a miscarriage could produce 
behavioral changes in a mother or family, which could lead to confounding sibship size effects 
with changes in mother’s behavior or family contexts. For example, if experiencing a 
miscarriage increased family stress, then it is possible that the IV estimate could mistake a family 
stress effect as a sibship size effect. 
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Findings 
OLS Estimates 
Table 3.3 reports the OLS estimates of the effect of sibship size on standardized PPVT 
score, first grade promotion, and early educational achievement for children in both low-income 
households and more affluent households. In the first and fourth column, we see that each 
additional sibling in a household is associated with a decrease in PPVT scores for children in 
low-income and affluent households. For children in low-income households, each additional 
sibling is associated with a 1.29 decrease in PPVT score. For children in more affluent 
households, each additional sibling is associated with a 1.6 decrease in PPVT score. In the 
second and fifth column, we see that sibship size does not have an effect on the odds of being 
promoted from kindergarten to first grade for children in low-income households or for children 
in more affluent households. In the third and sixth column, we see that sibship size is negatively 
associated with educational achievement in low-income and affluent households. Each additional 
sibling in a household is associated with a 0.2 decrease in a child’s score on the educational 
achievement scale for children in low-income households and a 0.24 decrease for children in 
more affluent households.  
Overall, these findings indicate that—net of demographic characteristics and economic 
hardship—that sibship size is negatively associated with cognitive development and early 
educational achievement in low-income households; however, this is not unique to low-income 
households. Affluent households see a similar relationship between sibship size and the tested 
outcomes. As sibship size increases, cognitive test scores and educational achievement decrease, 
but sibship size has no effect on the odds of promotion from kindergarten to first grade.  
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Moreover, the effect of each additional sibling is smaller in low-income households. The 
associated penalty for each additional sibling is greater in more affluent households.  
The other covariates reported in Table 3.3 report expected results. Time spent in poverty 
is a significant predictor of several outcomes. For children in low-income households, each year 
in poverty between birth and t5 is associated with a 1.81 decrease in PPVT scores and a 0.12 
decrease in the odds of being promoted to first grade. For children in more affluent households, a 
poverty spell is costly. Each year in poverty between birth and t5 is associated with a 2.01 
decrease in PPVT scores and a 0.29 decrease on the educational achievement scale. Mother’s 
education is positively associated with PPVT score for low-income children—low-income 
children with mothers who completed high school score 2.27 points higher on the PPVT than 
children whose mothers did not complete high school—and for children in more affluent 
households—children in affluent households with a mother who completed high school score an 
average of 5.15 points higher on the PPVT and 0.97 higher on the educational achievement scale.  
 The OLS estimates presented in Table 3.3 illustrate a clear association between 
sibship size and cognitive development and educational achievement. The relationship is found 
in both low-income households and affluent households. However, we should be cautious of 
interpreting these estimates as the effect of sibship size on cognitive development and 
educational achievement. At issue are the unobserved ways that households with more siblings 
vary from households with fewer siblings, leading to a possible spurious association between 
sibship size and cognitive development and educational achievement.
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Propensity Score Matching 
Estimates from the propensity score matching models are presented in Table 3.4. The 
first column and third column of Table 3.4 report the average treatment effect for an additional 
sibling across different sibship size groups on PPVT scores for children in low-income and 
affluent households respectively. For children in affluent households, there is no observed effect 
of an additional sibling across any of the tested pairs. For children in low-income households, we 
see that having three siblings in a household instead of two does lead to a decrease in PPVT 
scores by close to three percentage points. Similarly, adding an additional sibling from three to 
four in low-income households leads to a 2.57 percentage point decrease in PPVT score. 
However, the increases from one to two siblings, from four to five siblings, and from five to six 
siblings do not result in decreases in PPVT score. 
 In Column 2 and Column 5 of Table 3.4, we see the effect of variations in sibship size on 
the promotion to first grade for children in low-income and affluent household. For children in 
affluent households, we again find no difference across sibling groups. However, for children in 
low-income households, we observe an effect for some sibling pairs. An additional sibling from 
three to four or from four to five, results in a modest decrease in the odds of promotion to first 
grade, but there is no significant effect of sibship size on first grade promotion for increases from 
one to two siblings, from two to three siblings, or five to six siblings.
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In the third and sixth columns of Table 3.4, we see the effect of sibship size on 
educational achievement for children in low-income and affluent households. Here, we see that 
for children in more affluent households, an increase from two to three siblings leads to decrease 
in educational achievement, but there is no significant effect of increases in sibship size for other 
sibling sizes. For children in low-income households, an increase from one to two siblings has a 
positive effect on educational achievement, while an increase from two to three siblings has a 
modest negative effect on educational achievement. The gains made from one to two suggest that 
children’s kindergarten performance may be improved by the presence of a sibling. This is not 
entirely unexpected. Downey and Condron (2004) show that children who grow up with siblings 
have better interpersonal and social skills and are better able to negotiate peer relationships in 
kindergarten. Keep in mind that the educational achievement scale is based on kindergartner 
teacher assessment. Consequently, children with better interpersonal and social skills may appear 
more competent to their kindergartner teachers. 
Table 3.5 expands the matching analysis, reporting propensity score matching estimates 
with a common referent group. Specifically, the control group is two siblings in the household. 
In the first row, we see the treatment effect of having one additional sibling beyond two. In the 
second row, we see the treatment effect of having two additional siblings. For children in low-
income households, an additional sibling is related to a lower PPVT score but has no effect on 
promotion to first grade or kindergarten achievement. The presence of two additional siblings 
has no effect on any of the tested outcomes. For children in more affluent households, the effect 
of an additional sibling on PPVT score approaches statistical significance but is not statistically 
significant; however, it should be noted that the magnitude of the effect is similar to the effect 
observed for children in low-income households. The presence of two additional siblings is 
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associated with a statistically significant decrease in PPVT score, and is also associated with a 
decrease in kindergarten achievement. Moreover, an additional sibling has a small effect on 
promotion to first grade for children in affluent households.  
 Overall, the propensity score matching estimates diminish the relationship reported by 
the OLS estimates.  While there are some differences in cognitive development and educational 
achievement by sibship size, these differences are rare.  Similarly, there are some consistent 
findings across the OLS and propensity score matching estimates, but these too are rare. 
However, like the OLS models, the propensity score matching estimates are limited by relying 
on observed covariates. Consequently, we should be cautious of how omitted variables may bias 
placement in the treatment and control groups and how this may lead to spuriousness.  
Miscarriage as a Quasi-Experiment and Instrumental Variable  
Table 3.6 reports estimates of the effect of sibship size when we consider miscarriage a 
random event. The miscarriage coefficients report the effect of having one fewer sibling than 
expected for children in low-income and affluent households on PPVT score (in Column 1 and 
Column 4), on first grade promotion (in Column 2 and Column 5), and educational achievement 
(in Column 3 and Column 6). For children in affluent households, an additional sibling has no 
effect on any of the tested outcomes. For children in low-income households, an additional 
sibling has no effect on PPVT score or the odds of being promoted from kindergarten to first 
grade, but the effect on educational achievement approaches statistical significance and is 
significant in a one-tailed test. However, the effect is in the opposite direction from predicted: 
children who have one sibling less than expected because of miscarriage have a lower 
educational achievem
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There are three possible explanations for this unexpected result. First, miscarriages may 
produce a change in household dynamics that influences the child. If this is the case, then the 
observed effect should be thought of as a miscarriage effect, not a sibship size effect. Second, the 
relationship may be spurious. Consider Table 3.2, which summarizes household characteristics 
by miscarriage status. Households that report experiencing a miscarriage are different in ways 
other than miscarriage. If miscarriages are not sufficiently random, spuriousness is a real 
concern. Third, it is possible that increases in sibship size may produce better educational 
achievement in kindergarten. Children who grow up with siblings have better interpersonal and 
social skills in kindergarten (Downey & Condron 2004). The educational achievement scale is 
based on Kindergarten teacher perceptions. It is possible that kindergarten teachers conflate 
social skills and ability.  
Overall, the results presented in Table 3.6 muddy our understanding of the relationship 
between sibship size and cognitive development and educational achievement. When we treat 
miscarriage as a random event, we find that the effect of sibship size is not statistically different 
from zero for most outcomes and in the opposite direction for educational achievement in 
kindergarten for children in low-income households. While the OLS estimates demonstrate an 
association between sibship size and cognitive development and educational achievement, these 
results undermine a causal argument. 
Table 3.7 presents IV estimates. IV estimation is sensitive to small sample sizes. 
Consequently, I combine both the low-income and affluent analytic samples. The IV estimates 
report no significant effects of sibship size on cognitive or education outcomes. Mother’s 
education and income-to-poverty ratio are both positively associated with PPVT score and 
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kindergarten achievement but not first grade promotion. Similarly, time in poverty is negatively 
associated with PPVT score and kindergarten achievement.  
However, the lack of significant sibship size effects should be interpreted with caution. 
The partial R squared shows the correlation between the instrument and endogenous regressors. 
As the partial R squared approaches zero, the bias of the instrument increases (Bound et al 1995). 
The partial R squared from the first stage regression results is small. Similarly, the first stage F 
statistic does not exceed the critical value, which further suggests that miscarriage is a weak 
instrument (Staiger & Stock 1997). Moreover, the first stage results (not shown) of the 
instrumental variable model show that miscarriage is actually positively associated with the 
number of children in the household. Households who report experiencing a miscarriage on 
average have 0.211 more siblings in the household. If we consider the differences observed in 
Table 3.2, it appears that miscarriages may not be sufficiently random to satisfy the conditions of 
IV estimation.  
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Table 3.7 Instrumental Variable Estimate of the Effect of Sibship Size on Cognitive 
Development and Early Educational Achievement. 
  PPVT1 Promoted2 
Kindergarten 
Achievement2 
 
b/se b/se b/se    
        
Sibship Size 5.184+ -0.036 0.402    
 
(3.00) (0.06) (0.45)    
Mother Completed High School 4.220*** 0.013 0.358+   
 
(1.25) (0.03) (0.19)    
Parents in Stable Relationship -1.246 0.002 0.131    
 
(1.82) (0.04) (0.27)    
Poverty Ratio at Birth 1.511*** 0.001 0.143**  
 
(0.33) (0.01) (0.05)    
Time in Poverty -3.476*** -0.010 -0.299**  
 
(0.70) (0.02) (0.10)    
Constant 82.002*** 0.972*** 7.865*** 
 
(7.18) (0.15) (1.08)    
    N 908 908 892 
First Stage Partial R Squared .0219 .0219 .0233 
F Statistic 6.706 6.706 7.043 
10 % Critical Value 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Significant at + p<0.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
1 N=2136  
2 N=938
  91 
Discussion 
The negative relationship between sibship size and education outcomes is one of the 
more replicated findings in sociology. Recently, researchers have begun to question (1) whether 
this finding is causal (e.g. Conley & Glauber 2006; Guo & VanWey 1999) and (2) in what 
contexts sibship size effects may apply (e.g. Lu & Treiman 2008; Marteleto & Souza 2012). In 
the research presented here, I conduct several empirical tests of the effect of sibship size in low-
income and affluent households with a careful eye to causality. Overall, a cautious interpretation 
of the results should add to growing skepticism of the applicability of sibship size effects to 
different contexts.   
 There is a clear association between sibship size and PPVT score and educational 
achievement in kindergarten for children in both low-income and affluent households. It is less 
clear whether this relationship is causal. Propensity score matching estimates offer modest 
support for a causal interpretation of the effect of sibship size in low-income households on 
PPVT score, showing that in some cases an additional sibling in a household reduces PPVT 
score but not for all sibship size increases. Similarly, the propensity score estimates find no 
effect of sibship size on first grade promotion in low-income households, but modest effects on 
kindergarten educational achievement for some sibship size increases. In affluent households, the 
matching models find an effect on educational achievement when sibship size increases from 
two to three siblings, but no effects for any other sibship sizes or outcomes. However, the 
propensity score matching models may not adequately adjust for unobserved biases in sibship 
size. The miscarriage and IV models offer little support for a causal effect of sibship size, but 
these results should be interpreted with caution because of concerns the instrument does not 
sufficiently explain variations in sibship size. At the very least, these findings add to the growing 
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suspicion that sibship size effects can be easily measured with cross-sectional data and OLS 
regression methods and echo the call for more careful consideration of the social contexts where 
sibship size effects may or may not be relevant.  
It is important to note the overall modest effects of sibship size in low-income 
households. Children living in low-income households do worse in school. They have lower test 
scores. They complete fewer years of education. They are more likely to repeat a grade. They are 
more likely to dropout before completing high school. There are many factors that contribute to 
children living in low-income households doing worse in school, but too many siblings appears 
to be a small concern. If the observed associations are causal, the overall effect is modest.  
Moreover, the association between sibship size and cognitive development and educational 
achievement is smaller in low-income households.  
 The research presented here also has important implications for our understanding of the 
income achievement gap. If we had observed that sibship size influences cognitive development 
and educational achievement, then variations in family size by household income would matter. 
That is, variations in sibship size would need to inform our understanding of cognitive 
development and educational achievement gaps in the same way that other family effects do. 
However, the findings here offer little support for this argument. While the OLS estimates 
demonstrate a clear association between sibship size and cognitive development and early 
educational achievement in low-income households, evidence for a causal argument is mixed 
and empirically thin. Moreover, the observed associations between sibship size and cognitive 
development and early educational achievement in the OLS models are smaller in low-income 
households.   
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A limitation of the research presented in this paper is its focus on early childhood 
outcomes. It is possible that variations in sibship size may have a stronger impact on education 
and cognitive outcomes in later life. Though early achievement is a strong predictor of later 
achievement, which provides some confidence that the effect of sibship size will not change with 
age, research on outcomes during late childhood and adolescence is needed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE FORMATIVE YEARS, ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, AND 
BELIEFS ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN LESSENING POVERTY 
 
Introduction 
A large body of research considers the social determinants of support for government 
spending on antipoverty programs. This research is limited in two key ways. First, explanations 
of support for government spending on poverty largely focus on current economic and social 
contexts. At the individual level, researchers have considered how demographics, financial 
security, and political beliefs influence support for antipoverty programs (Gilens 1999; 
Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Kluegel & Smith 1981). At the macro-level, researchers have 
considered how changes in the unemployment rate or the onset of an economic recession 
influences support for government involvement in lessening poverty (Kam & Nam 2008; 
Kluegel 1987). By emphasizing contemporary contexts, existing research overlooks the 
potentially profound effect of past experiences. Consider economic recessions. There are 
compelling reasons to suspect that an economic recession would have an immediate effect on 
beliefs about lessening poverty. However, it is similarly likely that economic recessions have a 
lasting effect. After an economic recession passes, changed beliefs may remain. Consequently, 
research on beliefs about the government’s role in lessening poverty should consider not just 
contemporary contexts but also past experiences.  
A second gap in existing research stems from data limitations. Most existing research on 
support for government spending on poverty relies on cross-sectional data. As a result, 
understandings of the fluidity in beliefs about anti-poverty spending are incomplete. Because 
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existing research chiefly draws on cross-sectional data, it implicitly treats beliefs about spending 
on poverty as fixed and immutable. Accordingly, we know little about the stability or fluidity of 
beliefs about government spending on poverty or the determinants of attitude stability. For 
example, consider the relationship between household income and support for government 
spending on poverty. Household income and support for government spending on anti-poverty 
programs are negatively related. However, what happens if household income decreases? Do 
beliefs about government’s role in lessening poverty follow or do beliefs remain fixed?  
These two blind spots in existing research are notable. If past events are an important 
determinant of current beliefs, then the effect of an event will continue long after the event has 
ended. Consider the recent economic recession. The recent economic recession may color the 
lens through which people view the government’s role in lessening poverty for years to come. 
Similarly, if beliefs are sensitive to individual level economic shocks, then a receding tide not 
only lowers all boats but it also influences beliefs.  
In this study, I use both cross-sectional and panel data from the General Social Survey to 
(1) examine generational differences in beliefs about what the federal government should do 
about poverty and (2) examine whether beliefs about the government’s role in helping the poor 
are sensitive to micro and macro economic shocks. I first outline relevant social theories on the 
determinants of support for government involvement in lessening poverty and provide an 
overview of existing research. I next describe the data and analytic strategy used in this paper. 
Lastly, I discuss the findings and their implications.  
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Background 
Existing research on support for government spending on antipoverty programs draws 
heavily on self-interest and economic vulnerability models (Abner 2012, Gilens 1999, Hasenfeld 
& Rafferty 1989, Schlesinger & Heldman 2001). The self-interest hypothesis argues that 
individuals evaluate whether antipoverty policies would further or impede their own goals. In 
this context, individuals are making rational and utility maximizing decisions. Consider the 
strong and negative relationship between household income and support for spending on poverty 
(AuClaire 1984; Cook & Barrett 1992; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989). According to the self-
interest model, members of poor and near-poor households are making a rational decision by 
supporting spending on assistance to the poor because they are most likely to benefit from such 
spending. Members of higher income households are similarly making a rational decision by 
opposing spending because they are unlikely to directly benefit from that government spending 
or believe that increased spending will come through an increased tax burden.  
 The economic vulnerability hypothesis is similar to the self-interest hypothesis and 
argues an individual’s level of support for government spending on anti-poverty programs is 
determined by the precarity of her social and economic position (Abner 2012, Gilens 1999, 
Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989, Schlesinger & Heldman 2001). The economic vulnerability 
hypothesis like the self-interest hypothesis contends that attitudes about government spending on 
poverty are informed by potential returns to that spending: those who would benefit from 
increased spending are likely to support spending, and those who are unlikely to benefit from 
increased spending are likely to oppose spending (Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Kluegel 1987). 
As a result of the focus on self-interest and economic vulnerability, past studies 
principally emphasize how demographics and current contexts influence beliefs, revealing 
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modest relationships that are at times contradictory. For example, the poor and less educated are 
more likely to support government spending on poverty (Gilens 1999; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 
1989), a finding consistent with self-interest and economic vulnerability models. Yet, women are 
no more likely to support government spending on poverty than men, and African Americans are 
more likely to support spending regardless of current economic position (Gilens 1999). 
Moreover, during economic recessions, a time when we should expect increases in social and 
economic vulnerability, attitudes about government spending on poverty change little (Kluegel 
1987).   
More recently, scholars have begun to consider how community-level factors shape 
beliefs about spending on poverty (Abner 2012; Hopkins 2009; Merolla, Hunt, & Serpe 2011). 
Community context is usually measured as the percent poor or percent belonging to a 
demographic group at the neighborhood or county level. This line of research generally 
underscores the role of exposure to a social group or the prevalence of a belief in a community 
on individual attitudes, arguing variations in community contexts produce variations in 
individual beliefs. 
The role of current community context has also produced inconsistent findings that are 
difficult to explain. For example, Merolla, Hunt, and Serpe (2011) find that living in a zip code 
with a high level of poverty leads to increases in individualist explanations of the causes of 
poverty, a strong predictor of opposition to government spending on poverty programs (Feagin 
1975; Kluegel & Smith 1981). However, they also find that living in a zip code with a high level 
of poverty simultaneously leads to increases in structural explanations of poverty, a strong 
predictor of support for government spending on poverty programs. They label this inconsistent 
mindset “dual consciousness.” Similarly, Hopkins (2009) finds that individuals who live in areas 
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where the poor are mostly white are less likely to attribute poverty to individual failings, a belief 
that generally leads to support for government spending on poverty; however, this relationship is 
relatively weak when compared to the effect of percent republican, leading to the conclusion that 
exposure to poverty matters but not as much as exposure to beliefs about poverty.   
Missing from existing research is an understanding of how present beliefs are colored by 
the past. A large body of research in social psychology notes that beliefs and attitudes are largely 
formed during late adolescence (Cutler 1974; Dennis 1973; Krosnick & Alwin 1989). This 
timeframe is often referred to as the formative years or impressionable years. According to the 
formative years hypothesis, during late adolescence individuals are flexible and open to 
competing ideas, attitudes, and beliefs. Importantly, experiences that occur during the formative 
years have a profound impact. Beliefs and attitudes that are developed during the formative years 
are thought to become fixed and largely insusceptible to change.  
The social context in which individuals experience their formative years influences the 
attitudes and beliefs that are developed. Consequently, the contexts in which individuals 
experience their formative years are generation specific, making attitudes and beliefs 
generational. Following the formative years, attitudes are crystallized and then remain stable as 
an individual ages.  
Abundant scholarship notes the potential role of early life socializing influences on life 
long attitudes (Carlsson & Karlsson 1970; Cutler 1974; Dennis 1973; Krosnick & Alwin 1989; 
Ryder 1965; Schuman & Corning 2012). For example, timing of labor market entry influences 
life satisfaction and job satisfaction, with individuals who enter the labor market during 
recessions experiencing higher levels of job satisfaction and life satisfaction throughout their life 
(Bianchi 2013). Similarly, growing up in a recession has a strong effect on attitudes toward 
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government redistribution (Giuliano & Spilimbergo 2010), and growing up during the Great 
Depression had a lasting impact on attitudes and beliefs (Elder 1999). Additionally, research on 
collective memory, while generally not explicitly connected to the formative years hypothesis, 
has led to a nuanced understanding of the creation of generational effects on attitudes. Schuman 
and Scott (1989) find that cohorts remember world events and changes differently, and that 
events and changes that occurred during adolescence or early adulthood are especially important.  
The formative years hypothesis is logically consistent with other research. Foremost, as 
individuals age they become increasingly disconnected from issues not immediately connected to 
their own life, which ultimately leads to fewer chances to be confronted with attitude-challenging 
information (Bryne 1971). Moreover, social psychological research notes that when individuals 
make a decision, they draw on past knowledge (Olson & Zanna 1993; Ostrom & Brock 1969; 
Wood 1982). As individuals age, they accumulate an ever growing body of attitude-relevant 
knowledge to draw on. In a sense, attitudes beget attitude consistency. 
Ample research supports the conclusion that basic attitudes are fixed by early adulthood 
and then remain largely unchanged (Glenn 1974, 1989; Inglehart 1977; Jennings & Niemi 1981; 
Markus 1979; Sears 1983). For example, Fendrich and Lovoy (1988) show that attitudes during 
college are an excellent predictor of later life attitudes. Similarly, Marwell et al (1987) show that 
between 1965 and the mid 1980s, the attitudes of white Civil Rights activists remained largely 
stable. Moreover, Jennings and Niemi (1978) find that a wide range of political and social 
orientations were highly stable over an eight-year period. Additionally, they note that younger 
individuals were most likely to change attitudes, and that attitudes appeared to harden after early 
adulthood. Accordingly, past experiences are likely a strong predictor of current attitudes. There 
are clear implications for this study. Specifically, because macro social and economic contexts 
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vary by generation, we should expect cohort differences in support for government spending on 
poverty.  
Also missing from existing research is a clear understanding of when support changes. 
Event driven models of attitude change offer an informative but underutilized mechanism for 
understanding support for antipoverty programs. Rather than focusing on contemporary contexts, 
event driven models of attitude change focus on changes in contemporary contexts. Put 
succinctly, event driven models of attitude change contend that large-scale events have a causal 
effect on attitudes (Smith 1984). The model is simple: a discrete, widespread episode occurs and, 
in turn, individuals change their attitudes. For example, if we consider the outbreak of war a 
significant event, then we should expect the start of war to have some effect on attitudes. Event 
driven models of attitude change are supported by empirical research. In particular, research 
notes that presidential popularity (MacKuen & Turner 1984; Edwards 1990) and evaluations of 
the most important issues facing the nation (Smith 1985) can be explained by an event driven 
understanding of attitude change.  
If we accept that significant events produce changes in attitudes, then an important 
question is: do large-scale economic shocks influence beliefs about government spending on 
poverty? In describing the event driven model, Smith (1984) explicitly lists economic crises as 
an example of an event that should produce attitude change. However, the documented effects of 
increases in economic hardship on attitudes are often underwhelming. Kenworthy and Owens 
(2012) find that recessions have modest lasting effects on attitudes, while Kluegel (1987) 
concludes that the recession of the 1970s had no effect on attitudes about welfare spending.  
We can extend event driven models to the individual level. At the individual level, an 
event driven model of attitude change contends that a change in individual level social or 
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economic context is followed by a change in belief. For example, consider a particularly bad flu 
outbreak. A large spike in reported cases of the flu may lead an individual to change his or her 
perception of the flu vaccine. At the same time, if an individual were to contract the flu him or 
herself, this too would likely influence beliefs about the flu vaccine. Here what matters is not 
whether there is economic hardship at the macro level but that an individual experiences 
economic hardship. If an individual experiences economic hardship, does she change her beliefs 
about government spending on poverty?   
Data, measures, and methods 
I draw data from two sources: the cumulative cross-sectional file of the General Social 
Survey (GSS) and the recently introduced GSS longitudinal data (Smith et al 2012). From the 
cross-sectional data, I use 19 separate surveys that cover a span of 28 years (1984 to 2012). From 
the longitudinal data, I combine three panels. In the first panel, respondents were interviewed in 
2006, 2008, and 2010. In the second panel, respondents were interviewed in 2008, 2010, and 
2012. In the third panel, respondents were interviewed in 2010 and 2012. Respondents in the 
third panel will be interviewed again in 2014.  
 The cross-sectional and longitudinal data have complementary strengths. The pooled 
cross-sectional data allow me to explore temporal trends in beliefs about government 
involvement in lessening poverty, allow me to test for differences across cohorts, and allow me 
to examine how macro-economic hardship influences beliefs. The longitudinal data allow me to 
observe how individual level changes in economic hardship influence beliefs. Instead of focusing 
on the effect of an individual’s contemporary social and economic contexts, the longitudinal data 
allow me to examine how changes in contexts create changes in belief.  
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Outcomes Measures 
In both the cross-sectional and panel surveys, respondents are asked three questions related to the 
government’s role in lessening poverty. The first question reads:  
“Some people think that the government in Washington should do everything possible to 
improve the standard of living of all poor Americans. Other people think that it is not the 
government’s responsibility, and that each person should take care of himself. Where would 
you place yourself on this scale?”  
Respondents are offered a 5-item response set, ranging from (1) government action to (5) people 
should help selves with (3) serving as a midpoint for agreeing with both sides. I collapse (4) and 
(5) into one category and (1) through (3) into a separate category, creating an indicator variable 
where 1 = believe people should help selves and 0 = government should help.  
 The second questions reads, 
“We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or 
inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to 
tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right 
amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on assistance to the 
poor?”  
I collapse “about right” and “too little” into one category, creating a reference variable where 
1=government is spending too much on assistance to the poor and 0=other.   
 The final question reads the same as above, except replaces “assistance to the poor” with 
“welfare.” Specifically,  
“We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or 
inexpensively. I’m going to name some of these problems, and for each one I’d like you to 
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tell me whether you think we’re spending too much money on it, too little, or about the right 
amount. Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on welfare?” 
I again collapse “about right” and “too little” into one category, creating a reference variable 
where 1=government is spending too much on welfare and 0=other. 
Measures of Economic Hardship  
I include two measures of economic hardship in the cross-sectional models: (1) a reference 
variable for whether the respondent’s annual household income falls in the bottom income 
quartile, and (2) a reference variable for whether there was a large increase in the poverty rate 
from the previous year. A large increase is defined as an increase in the poverty rate greater than 
half of a percent from the previous year. This occurs in 4 out of 19 possible survey years and 
coincides with the economic recession in the early 1990s and the most recent economic 
recession. Other thresholds (.3 and .6) were tested and produced substantively similar results 
(results not shown).      
In the longitudinal models, I measure economic hardship as a loss of annual household 
income between t and t+1. Following others (Owens & Pedulla forthcoming), I measure income 
loss with an indicator variable where 1=lost 20 percent or more of household income and 
0=other.   
Demographic and Background Variables 
I also include several demographic and background variables, including gender, race, educational 
attainment, marital status, number of children in the household, region of residence, cohort, and 
year. Summary statistics and description of the coding for all variables are presented in Table 
4.1. 
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Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Description of All Variables.  
Variable Description and Coding Mean Min Max 
Self Help 
People should help themselves out of poverty without 
government assistance; 1=agree; 0=disagree 0.26 0 1 
Spending Too Much on Assistance 
The government is spending too much on assistance to 
the poor; 1=agree; 0=disagree 0.11 0 1 
Spending Too Much on Welfare 
The government is spending too much on welfare; 
1=agree; 0=disagree 0.45 0 1 
Bottom Income Quartile 
Annual household income falls in bottom income 
quartile; Cross-sectional models only; 1=bottom 
quartile; 0=other 0.25 0 1 
Loss of Income 
Annual household income fell by 20 percent or more 
between waves; panel models only; 1=yes; 0=no 0.17 0 1 
Large Increase in Poverty Rate 
Increase in the poverty rate from previous year is 
greater than 0.49; 1=yes; 0=no 0.17 0 1 
Education Highest degree completed 
   Less Than High School 1=less than high school; 0=high school 0.17 0 1 
Some College 1= some college; 0=high school 0.07 0 1 
College+ 1=college+; 0=high school 0.23 0 1 
Race 
Respondent's race; 1=non-Hispanic black; 0=non-
Hispanic white 0.15 0 1 
Gender Respondent's gender; 1=female; 0=male 0.56 0 1 
Marital Status Respondent's marital status1=married; 0=not married 0.5 0 1 
Number of Children Number of children 1.9 0 1 
Age 
Respondent's age; grand-mean centered and divided by 
10 4.59 18 89 
Region Current region of residence 
   Northeast 1=Northeast; 0=South 0.19 0 1 
Midwest 1=Midwest; 0=South 0.26 0 1 
West 1=West; 0=South 0.19 0 1 
Cohort 5-year birth cohort 1948 1900 1985 
Period Survey year 1997 1984 2012 
Note: N for cross-sectional data=22,915; N for panel-data=3,052. 
Means for all variables come from cross-sectional data except for “Loss of Income.” 
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Analytic Strategy  
To assess variations in attitudes toward the government’s role in lessening poverty, I first 
analyze the GSS cross-sectional data using a cross-classified random effects model (Raudenbush 
& Bryk 2002; Yang 2008). In this approach, individual level attributes such as income, sex, and 
education are treated as level-one covariates and are modeled as fixed-effects. These individual 
level covariates are nested within a time period by birth-cohort cross-classified matrix, where 
period and cohort are level-two covariates that are modeled as random effects. This allows me to 
separately and simultaneously consider the influence of period effects and cohort effects net of 
individual level characteristics.  
 The level one within cell model can be expressed as:  
Yijk =! jk +"1 jkX + eijk   (Equation 1) 
where Yijk is the response outcome for the ith respondent in jth period and kth cohort. denotes 
level-one coefficients. X denotes a vector of level-one covariates. is the cell mean for the 
reference group at the mean for period j and cohort k. is the within cell residual. 
 The level-two between-cell model can be expressed as: 
! jk = " 0 + t0 j + c0k  (Equation 2) 
where is the expected mean at the zero values for all level-one covariates. is the overall 
period effect of period j averaged over all birth cohorts, and is the overall cohort effect of 
cohort k averaged over all time periods. Thus, is the random intercept for period j and cohort 
k, and specifies that the overall mean varies across periods and across cohorts. 
The period and cohort effects are of particular interest. The period effects show whether 
attitudes toward the government’s role in lessening poverty are sensitive to period events. The 
!
! jk
eijk
! 0 t0 j
c0k
! jk
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cohort effects show whether the timing of when individuals come of age and the associated 
contexts have a lasting impression on attitudes toward government’s role in lessening poverty. 
I next estimate a pooled cross-sectional logit analysis of the form:  
log(Pit /1!Pit ) = Xit!1 +PovRateInct!2 + vt +"it   (Equation 3) 
where X is a vector of individual level covariates measured at time t for person i, PovRateInc is a 
indicator variable for whether there a large increase in the poverty rate from the previous year, v 
is a time-specific error term, and ! is the random error term. I cluster standard errors by year. 
This analysis allows me to determine how large increases in the poverty rate shift attitudes 
toward the government’s involvement in lessening poverty. 
Lastly, to assess whether beliefs about government’s involvement in lessening poverty 
are sensitive to individual level changes in economic hardship, I use the panel data from the GSS 
and a fixed-effects model. The basic model can be expressed as:  
   !!" ! ! ! !!!!"#$%&!!"##!" ! !"#$% ! !!"  (Equation 4) 
where y is the response for person i at time t, and is a function of time-variant income loss, year-
fixed effects, and a time-varying error term (!). This model allows me to assess the extent to 
which a loss of income leads to a change in beliefs about the government’s role in lessening 
poverty.  
As a robustness check, I perform a “placebo” regression where I use the same model to 
estimate how loss of income influences attitudes toward end of life and gun laws. Placebo 
regression tests for effects where a causal pathway seems unlikely or impossible. The end of life 
question reads, “When a person has a disease that cannot be cured, do you think doctors should 
be allowed by law to end the patient’s life by some painless means if the patient and his family 
request it?” (1=yes; 0=no). The gun law question reads, “Would you favor or oppose a law 
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which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun?” 
(1=favor; 0=oppose). A statistically significant relationship between income loss and attitudes 
toward end of life laws or between income loss and gun laws is unlikely causal, and should make 
us skeptical of any observed relationships between income loss and changes in beliefs about the 
government’s role in lessening poverty.  
Findings 
Formative Years, Period Events, and Beliefs about Anti-Poverty Spending    
Figure 4.1 shows period and cohort variations in beliefs about government involvement 
in lessening poverty. In the first panel, we see period variations in the belief that individuals 
should help themselves out of poverty without government help, belief that the government is 
spending too much on assistance to the poor, and belief that the government is spending too 
much on welfare. This panel reveals two key findings. First, people are much more resistant to 
welfare spending than other government spending or action. Second, the period trends largely 
mirror each other across outcomes. There is an increase in opposition to government 
involvement throughout the early and mid-1990s for all outcomes; however, following welfare 
reform, there is a prominent decline in opposition. 
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Figure 4.1 Period and cohort variation in support for government involvement and spending on 
lessening poverty. 
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In the second panel of Figure 4.1, we see variations in these outcomes by cohort. For 
belief that individuals should help themselves out of poverty without government assistance and 
belief that the government is spending too much on assistance to the poor, we see a modest 
downward trend across cohorts with younger cohorts becoming more supportive of government 
involvement and government spending on assistance. For belief that the government is spending 
too much on welfare, the cohort trend is U shaped with baby boom cohorts most strongly 
believing the government is spending too much on welfare. However, the overall cohort 
differences for all outcomes are slight.   
Moving from the descriptive findings to the multivariate findings, Table 4.2 presents 
estimates of the individual level fixed-effects coefficients and the random-effect variance 
components from the cross-classified random effects model for all outcomes. We see the effect 
of all level-one covariates on the odds of opposing government involvement in helping people 
out of poverty in the first column, the odds of believing the government is spending too much on 
assistance for the poor in the second column, and the odds of believing the government is 
spending too much on welfare in the third column.  
Most notably, for all outcomes there is a significant period effect, but there is not a 
significant cohort effect. In fact, cohort effects have to be excluded from the second and third 
models because the intercepts for the cohort effects are estimated to be zero (models not shown). 
This indicates that attitudes toward the government’s role in lessening poverty, toward 
government spending on assistance to the poor, and toward government spending on welfare all 
respond to period events, but there is no significant cohort effect. Generational grouping does not 
appear to influence belief about the government’s role in addressing poverty.  When individuals 
come of age does not leave a lasting impression. What matters is the contemporary. 
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Table 4.2 Odds Ratio Estimates from Logit Cross-Classified Random Effects Models of 
Attitudes toward Government Involvement and Government Spending on Poverty. 
Fixed-Effects Self Help1 
Too Much 
Assistance2 
Too Much 
Welfare3 
Bottom Income Quartile -0.3839*** -0.3968*** -0.4744*** 
Education 
   Less Than High School -0.3981*** -0.1501+ -0.1724*** 
Some College 0.1058+ 0.05301 0.03852 
College+ 0.2234*** 0.09208 -0.3917*** 
African American -1.0737*** -1.358*** -0.8061*** 
Female -0.4202*** -0.177*** -0.03897 
Married 0.1438*** 0.09673+ 0.1141** 
Number of Children 0.02021+ -0.00764 -0.00776 
Age -0.0088 0.004605 0.0211*** 
Age2 0.000188** 0.000044 -0.00021*** 
Region 
   Northeast -0.38*** -0.4279 -0.09607* 
Midwest -0.198*** -0.0958 -0.1715*** 
West -0.141** -0.1052 -0.1377** 
Intercept -0.5923*** -1.8055*** 0.2155* 
Random Effects - Variance Components       
Period Effect 0.01137* 0.07589** 0.08293** 
Cohort Effect 0.002243 - - 
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
1 N=22,915 
2 N=18,113 
3 N=17,145 
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Figure 4.2. Overall Period Effects on Support for Government Involvement and Government 
Spending on Poverty. 
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Figure 4.2 displays the overall period trends for each outcome in terms of predicted 
probabilities. The period trends largely mirror each other and are very similar to the trends 
displayed in the descriptive findings. Overall, we see smaller fluctuations in the belief that the 
individuals should help themselves out of poverty, and a prominent spike in the belief that the 
government is spending too much on assistance to the poor and on welfare that crescendos in the 
early-1990s, peaks in the mid-1990s, and then falls throughout the late-1990s.  
While it is difficult to explicitly test for the effect of welfare reform, two associations are 
clear. First, in the years leading up to welfare reform, there was growing belief that the 
government was spending too much on assistance to the poor and too much on welfare. Second, 
attitudes shifted after welfare reform. Following welfare reform, there was a precipitous decline 
in the belief that the government was spending too much on assistance to the poor and too much 
on welfare.  
The individual level covariates are largely in-line with past research. Members of the 
bottom income quartile are much more likely to support government involvement and 
government spending than those with higher incomes. Compared to whites, African Americans 
are more likely to support an active role of the government in addressing poverty. Men are more 
likely than women to believe individuals should help themselves out of poverty without 
government help and are also more likely to believe the government spends too much on 
assistance to the poor, but there are no significant differences between men and women on 
beliefs about spending on welfare.  
There are also notable regional differences with the South less likely to support 
government involvement than all other regions. Residents of the Northeast, Midwest, and West 
are also less likely to believe the government is spending too much on welfare. However, there 
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are only minimal regional differences in beliefs about government spending on assistance to the 
poor—residents of the South are less likely to support government spending on assistance to the 
poor compared to residents of the Northeast, but there are no regional differences between the 
South and Midwest or the South and West. 
There is also no clear pattern for educational attainment across outcomes. Increasing 
education is generally associated with increased belief that individuals should help themselves 
out of poverty without government help. However, this trend does not hold for beliefs about 
government spending on welfare or government spending on assistance to the poor. High school 
dropouts and college graduates are less likely than high school graduates to believe the 
government is spending too much on welfare, and there are no significant differences by 
educational attainment in the belief that the government is spending too much on assistance to 
the poor.  
 
Are Beliefs Sensitive to Changes in Macro Level Economic Hardship? 
Table 4.3 presents results from the pooled data for all outcomes. For each outcome, I estimate 
two models. In the first model, I separately estimate the effect of a large increase in the poverty 
rate and having an income in the bottom quartile net of other demographic covariates. In the 
second model, I include an interaction term for having an income in the bottom quartile during a 
time period that sees a large increase in the poverty rate.  
Overall, we observe a similar pattern for belief that individuals should move out of 
poverty without government aid and belief that the government is spending too much on 
assistance to the poor.  In the first and third column, we see that members of the bottom income 
quartile are much less likely to believe that individuals should move out of poverty without 
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government aid (odds ratio: 0.70 and 0.67). Similarly, in years where there is a high increase in 
poverty, individuals are less likely to believe that individuals should help themselves out of 
poverty or that the government is spending too much on assistance to the poor (odds ratio: 0.89 
and 0.82). However, both of these odds ratios are only significant in a one-tailed test (p=.096 and 
p=.077).  
In the second and forth columns of Table 4.3, the interaction effect between membership 
in the bottom income quartile and high poverty year produces two noteworthy findings. First, for 
individuals with higher incomes, there is no difference in attitudes between high poverty years 
and other years. Second, the disparity between the bottom income quartile and all others widens 
during high poverty years. This suggests that broader conditions influence beliefs for the poor, 
but not the non-poor, and the near significant result observed in Columns 1 and 3 are likely 
largely explained by shifts in the bottom income quartile.   
Columns 5 and 6 present odds ratios for believing the government is spending too much 
on welfare. Here we see a modest variation from the pattern shown in Columns 1 through 4. 
First, a large increase in the poverty rate has a clear and significant effect (Column 5). The odds 
of believing that the government is spending too much on welfare during high poverty years are 
.22 times the odds in other years. Second, a spike in the poverty rate does not produce a shift 
only in the bottom income quartile (Column 6). In years where there is a high poverty rate, the 
odds a member of middle or high-income quartiles thinks the government is spending too much 
on poverty are .22 times the odds in other years.  Otherwise, the patterning is the same as the 
results presented for the other outcomes: members of the bottom income quartile are far less 
likely to believe that the government is spending too much on welfare and the income gap in 
belief widens during high poverty years.   
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Are Beliefs Sensitive to Micro-Level Economic Hardship? 
Table 4.4 presents the results from the fixed-effects models using the longitudinal data. The first 
three columns show the effect of economic hardship on the main outcomes. In the first column 
we see that a loss of income leads to individuals becoming less likely to believe that the poor 
should help themselves out of poverty. In the second column we see that a loss of income makes 
individual less likely to believe the government is spending too much on assistance to the poor. 
In the third column we see that a loss of income does not lead to a change in beliefs about 
government spending on welfare. While beliefs about government’s role in moving people out of 
poverty and belief about government spending on assistance to the poor respond to individual 
level economic hardship, beliefs about government spending on welfare do not. 
The last two columns of Table 4.4 show the effect of economic hardship on the placebo 
outcomes. In the fourth column we see that a loss of income does not produce a change in belief 
about end of life laws. In the fifth column we see that a loss of income does not produce a 
change in support for gun laws. The lack of significant results for the effect of income loss on 
end of life and gun laws should gives us confidence in the robustness of the results presented in 
the first three columns.   
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Table 4.4 Fixed-Effects Models of the Effect of Income Loss on Attitudes Toward Government 
Involvement in Lessening Poverty, Government Spending on Poverty, and Placebo Outcomes. 
  Self Help1 
Too Much 
Assistance2 
Too Much 
Welfare3 End of Life4 Gun Law5 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se    
Lost ! 20% Income -0.034* -0.016* -0.010 -0.006 -0.012    
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Year 2008 0.012 -0.005 -0.009 -0.013 -0.012    
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
Year 2010 0.075*** 0.023* 0.040+ -0.004 -0.034*   
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Year 2012 0.080*** 0.034** 0.078** 0.001 -0.033+   
 
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
Intercept 0.226*** 0.072*** 0.379*** 0.706*** 0.795*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)    
+ p < .1; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
1 N=2,781 
2 N=3,052 
3 N=2,045 
4 N=2,722 
5 N=2,771 
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Discussion 
Attitudes about government involvement and spending on poverty are not 
inconsequential. Does public opinion determine public policy? No; however, research clearly 
shows that public opinion plays an important role in shaping policy (Burstein 1979; Brooks & 
Manza 2006; Page & Shapiro 1982). Anti-poverty legislation, in particular, is susceptible to 
public opinion. Elected officials fear repercussions from the electorate, and anti-poverty 
legislation and rhetoric routinely serves as a rallying point for small government proponents.  
 In seeking to understand how an individual’s economic and social position influences 
attitudes toward government spending on poverty, existing research has largely focused on 
current contexts. The research presented here replicates many of these findings, showing that 
current economic position and demographics are important determinants of beliefs, and also 
extends this research by considering how generational experiences may shape current belief and 
how beliefs change over time. Specifically, I examine if cohort membership and economic 
hardship at the macro or micro level influences beliefs.  
 There are strong theoretical reasons to expect distinct cohort differences. Research on 
other political beliefs and attitudes shows that the shared contexts and experiences of cohorts 
have a lasting influence on beliefs (Cutler 1974; Dennis 1973; Krosnick & Alwin 1989). 
However, this is not the case for beliefs about the government’s role in lessening poverty. There 
is no significant or systematic variation by cohort. Cohorts who came of age during President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty are no more or less likely to support anti-poverty spending or 
government involvement than other cohorts. The social and economic contexts of when people 
come of age do not color beliefs about the government’s role in lessening poverty. The absence 
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of cohort differences suggests that beliefs about the government’s role in lessening poverty do 
not follow the formative years hypothesis.  
 However, beliefs do shift in response to economic hardship. Most notably, in years where 
there is a large increase in the poverty rate, there is a modest decrease in the belief that 
individuals should help themselves out of poverty without government aid and a modest decrease 
in the belief that the government is spending too much on assistance to the poor. However, 
members of the bottom income quartile, who are particularly responsive to increases in the 
poverty rate, drive much of this shift. In years where there is a large increase in the poverty rate, 
the gap between the bottom income quartile and other households widens substantially for these 
two outcomes. Meanwhile, for more affluent households, there is no significant difference in 
belief during high poverty years and other years. There is, however, a modest deviation from this 
pattern for beliefs about government spending on welfare. In particular, there is a significant 
difference for higher income quartiles in years where there is a large increase in the poverty rate 
compared to other years. In high poverty years, high-income households are less likely to believe 
the government is spending too much on welfare. These results offer nuanced support for event 
driven models of attitude change. Attitudes do respond to events, but not for all outcomes and 
not for all groups. Those who are most affected by the event have more malleable attitudes, 
while those who are unaffected have more static beliefs.   
 The longitudinal results offer further mixed support for event driven models of attitude 
change at the individual level and reveal that beliefs about government involvement in lessening 
poverty are fluid. Rather than fixed and stable, individual economic hardship does lead to a shift 
in beliefs. When individuals lose a portion of their annual household income, they become less 
likely to believe that individuals should help themselves out of poverty without government help 
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and they become less likely to believe the government is spending too much on assistance to the 
poor. However, beliefs about government spending on welfare remain unchanged. 
 The research presented here offers mixed support for self-interest and economic 
vulnerability models. Individuals who are most likely to benefit from government spending and 
government involvement are significantly more likely to support government involvement and 
government spending on assistance to the poor. However, an increase in economic hardship is 
not followed by a change in support for government spending on welfare. This is likely because 
of the symbolic importance of welfare beliefs. Research shows that much of the opposition to 
welfare is rooted in ideology (Feagin 1975; Feldman & Zaller 1992; Kluegel & Smith 1981; 
Williamson 1974). The stability of welfare beliefs following a loss of income offers some 
evidence that ideological commitments shape poverty beliefs. Moreover, of the three outcomes 
examined in this paper, the belief that individuals should help themselves out of poverty without 
government help is most closely related to what Huber and Form (1973) called the dominant 
ideology. This belief in self-help is the most stable across period events with much smaller 
fluctuations in the overall trend. This too offers some evidence that ideological commitments are 
more stable and less driven by self-interest.   
 Additional research is needed. In particular, research is needed on long-term shifts in 
outcomes. The research presented in this paper shows that loss of income leads to a decrease in 
opposition to government spending on assistance to the poor and decreased belief that 
individuals should help themselves out of poverty without government assistance. It is unclear 
whether these are temporary or long lasting shifts. Because the GSS panel data only includes 
three waves, it is not possible to explore whether economic hardship has a long lasting influence 
on belief. However, it seems unlikely that the observed shifts are permanent. The absence of 
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cohort effects and the clear importance of current economic position in the cross-sectional 
models suggest that the changes in belief that occur after experiencing economic hardship will be 
short lived. What matters in determining beliefs about the government’s role in lessening poverty 
appears to be current position and contexts. This has a notable implication for public policy. In 
particular, the opportunity window for passing policy with broad support may be narrow. If 
attitudes respond to economic hardship, then policymakers will enjoy the most support for efforts 
to help the poor during economic hard times.   
 An additional limitation comes at the expense of one of the strengths of the longitudinal 
data. The longitudinal data were collected between 2006 and 2012, a time where an abnormally 
large number of households faced economic hardship. For research purposes, this is 
advantageous: we have a large analytic sample of households that experienced economic 
hardship. However, this also requires us to carefully consider how the larger social and economic 
contexts may influence the presented findings.  
Of particular concern is that what we are observing is not the effect of losing income on 
attitudes, but rather the effect of losing income during an economic recession. This is an 
important distinction. It is possible that a loss of household income during booming economic 
times does not have the same effect. Perhaps during economic good times individuals who lose a 
portion of their household income are more likely to blame themselves and think nothing of the 
role of the government in aiding the poor. Research on the effects of income loss during 
economic booms is needed. Unfortunately, such data are not available at present.  
   
  130 
REFERENCES 
Abner, Kristin S. 2011. Determinants of Welfare Policy Attitudes: A Contextual Level Analysis.  
Sociological Spectrum 31:466-97. 
 
AuClaire, Philip A. 1984. Public Attitudes Toward Social Welfare Expenditures. Social Work  
29: 139-44. 
 
Bianchi, Emily C. 2013. The Bright Side of Bad Times: The Affective Advantage of Entering the  
Workforce in a Recession. Administrative Science Quarterly 58: 587-623. 
 
Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. 2006. Social Policy Responsiveness in the Developed  
Democracies. American Sociological Review 71:474-94. 
 
Byrne, Donn. 1971. The Attraction Paradigm. New York: Academic Press. 
 
Burstein, Paul. 1979. Public Opinion, Demonstrations, and the Passage of Antidiscrimination  
Legislation. Public Opinion Quarterly 79:157-72. 
 
Carlsson, Gosta, and Katarina Karlsson. 1970. Age, Cohorts, and the Generation of Generations.  
American Sociological Review 35:710-18.  
 
Cook, Fay Lomax, and Edith J. Barrett. 1992. Support for the American Welfare State. New  
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Cutler, N. E. 1974. Aging and Generations in Politics: The Conflict of Explanations and  
Inference. In A. R. Wilcox (Ed.), Public Opinion and Political Attitudes. (Pp.440-62). 
New York: Wiley. 
 
Dennis, Jack. 1973. Socialization to Politics: A Reader. New York: Wiley. 
 
Edwards, George C. 1990. Presidential Approval: A Sourcebook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins  
University Press. 
 
Elder, Glen H. 1999. Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experiences.  
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Feagin, Joe R. 1975. Subordinating the Poor. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
 
Feldman, Stanley, and John Zaller. 1992. The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological  
Responses to the Welfare State. American Journal of Political Science 36:268-307. 
 
Gilens, Martin. 1999. Why Americans Hate Welfare. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Glenn, Norval D. 1974. Aging and Conservatism. Annals of the Academy of Political and Social  
 Science 415:176-86. 
  131 
Hasenfeld, Yeheskel, and Jane A. Rafferty. 1989. The Determinants of Public Attitudes toward  
the Welfare State. Social Forces: 67:1027-48. 
 
Hopkins, Daniel J. 2009. Partisan Reinforcement and the Poor: The Impact of Context on  
Explanations for Poverty. Social Science Quarterly 90:744-64. 
 
Huber, Joan, and William Form. 1973. Income and Ideology: An Analysis of the American  
Political Formula. New York: Free Press.  
 
Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles in  
 Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
 
Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard G. Niemi. 1978. The Persistence of Political Orientations: An  
Over-Time Analysis of Two Generations. British Journal of Political Science 8: 333-63. 
 
________. 1981. Generations and Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Kam, Cindy D., and Yunju Nam. 2008. Reaching Out or Pulling Back: Macroeconomic  
Conditions and Public Support for Social Welfare Spending. Political Behavior 30:223-
58.  
 
Kenworthy, Lane, and Lindsay A. Owens. 2012. How Do Economic Recessions Influence Public  
 Opinion? In David Grusky, Bruce Western, and Christopher Wimer (Eds.), The Great  
 Recession. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
 
Kluegel, James R. 1987. Macro-Economic Problems, Beliefs about the Poor and Attitudes  
toward Welfare Spending. Social Problems 34:82-99. 
 
Kluegel, James R., and Eliot R. Smith. 1981. Beliefs about Stratification. Annual Review of  
Sociology 7:29-56. 
 
Krosnick, Jon A., and Duane F. Alwin. 1989. Aging and Susceptibility to Attitude Change.  
 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57:416-25. 
 
MacKuen, Michael B., and Charles F Turner. 1984. The Popularity of Presidents, 1963-1980. In  
Charles F. Turner and Elizabeth Martin (Eds.) Surveying Subjective Phenomena. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation.  
 
Markus, G. B. 1979. The Political Environment and Dynamics of Public Attitudes: A Panel  
 Study. American Journal of Political Science 23:338-59. 
 
Marwell, Gerald, Michael T. Aiken, and N. J. Demerath III. 1987. The Persistence of Political  
Attitudes Among 1960s Civil Rights Activists. Public Opinion Quarterly 51: 359-75. 
 
Merolla, David M., Matthew O. Hunt, and Richard T. Serpe. 2011. Concentrated Disadvantage  
  132 
and Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty: A Multi-Level Analysis. Sociological 
Perspectives 54:205-28. 
 
Olson, James M., and Mark P. Zanna. 1993. Attitudes and Attitude Change. Annual Review of  
Psychology 44:117-54. 
 
Ostrom, Thomas M., and Timothy C. Brock. 1969. Cognitive Bonding to Central Values and  
Resistance to a Communicating Change in Policy Orientation. Journal of Experimental 
Research in Personality 4:42-50. 
 
Owens, Lindsay A., and David S. Pedulla. Forthcoming. Material Welfare, Ideology, and  
Changing Political Preferences: The Case of Support for Redistributive Policies. Social  
Forces. 
 
Page, Benjamin I., and R. Y. Shapiro. 1982. Changes in Americans’ Policy Preferences, 1935- 
1979.” Public Opinion Quarterly 46:24-42. 
 
Raudenbush, Stephen W., and Anthony S. Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical Linear Models:  
Applications and Data Analysis Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
 
Ryder, Norman B. 1965. The Cohort as a Concept in the Study of Social Change. American  
Sociological Review 30:843-61. 
 
Schlesinger, Mark, and Caroline Heldman. 2001. Gender Gap or Gender Gaps? New  
Perspectives on Support for Government Action and Policies. Journal of Politics 63:59- 
92. 
 
Schuman, Howard, and Amy Corning. 2012. Generational Memory and the Critical Period:  
Evidence for National and World Events. Public Opinion Quarterly 76:1-31. 
 
Schuman, Howard, and Jacqueline Scott. 1989. Generations and Collective Memories. American  
Sociological Review 54: 359-81. 
 
Sears, David O. 1983. The Persistence of Early Political Predispositions: The Roles of Attitude  
Object and Life Stage. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of Personality and Social Psychology  
(Vol. 4, pp. 79-116). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 
 
Smith, Tom W. 1984. Is There Real Opinion Change? International Journal of Public Opinion  
Research 6:187-203. 
 
_______. 1985. The Polls: America's Most Important Problems: Part 1. Public Opinion  
Quarterly 49:264-74. 
 
Smith, Tom W., Peter V. Marsden, Michael Hout, Jibum Kim. General Social Survey, 1972- 
  133 
2012. 2013. Principle Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigators, Peter V. 
Marsden and Michael Hout, NORC ed. Chicago: National Opinion Research Center. 
Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.  
 
Williamson, John B. 1974. Beliefs about the Motivation of the Poor and Attitudes toward  
Poverty Policy. Social Problems 21: 634-48. 
 
Wood, Wendy. 1982. Retrieval of Attitude-Relevant Information from Memory: Effects on  
Susceptibility to Persuasion and on Intrinsic Motivation. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 42:798-810.  
 
Yang, Yang. 2008. Age-Period-Cohort Analysis of Repeated Cross-Section Surveys: Fixed or  
Random Effects? Sociological Methods and Research 36:297-326.  
 
